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EFFECTIVE POLLUTION CONTROL IN
INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES: INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC DISINCENTIVES, POLICY
RESPONSES, AND THE GATT
Frederic L. Kirgis, Jr.*
I. THE IssuEs AND THEm PRESENTATION
A. Introduction
T is generally recognized that efforts toward meaningful pollution
control by an industrialized nation or group of nations raise
economic problems at the international level. Discussion has touched
upon the balance of trade1 and the effects for developing countries. 2
Yet there seems to have been little attempt to analyze how these
problems will manifest themselves and how they may be resolved
within the current international legal-economic ordering system.8
This Article cannot deal with them all, but will examine closely the
international competitive disincentives to truly effective pollution-
control efforts in the industrialized countries, where environmental
imperatives bear heavily on national decision-makers. Such an ex-
amination will suggest policies likely to be adopted by those countries
to deal with the economic disincentives-policies that may exacerbate
existing strains on the legal framework for world trade, embodied in
* Professor of Law, University of Colorado. B.A. 1957, Yale University; LL.B. 1960,
University of California (Berkeley).
I am grateful to Professors Charles W. Howe and Stephen F. Williams, of the Uni-
versity of Colorado Department of Economics and School of Law, respectively, for
their helpful comments on a draft of a portion of this paper. All errors, however, are
the responsibility of the author.
1. See COUNCML ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, SECOND ANNUAL REPORT 131-33 (1971)
[hereinafter CEQ 1971 REPORT]; E. MIssrAiN, THE COSTS OF ECONomic GRoWiTH 17-34
(1967); Gardner, Can the U.N. Lead the Environmental Parade?, 64 AM. J. INTL. L.,
No. 4, at 211, 212 (Am. Soc. Intl. L. Proceedings) (1970); Humpstone, Pollution:
Precedent and Prospect, 50 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 325, 336-38 (1972); Report of U.N. Secretary-
General to the 47th Session of the Economic and Social Council on Problems of the
Human Environment, U.N. Doc. E/4667, at 21, 32 (1969).
2. See REPORT or THE STUDY OF CRnTCAL ENVIRONmENTAL PROBLE rS, MANS IMPACT
ON THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT 249-54 (C. Wilson ed. 1970); Reports of the Preparatory
Committee for the U.N. Conference on the Human Environment, U.N. Dos.
A/Conf.48/PC.6, at 6 (1970), and A/Conf.48/PC.9, at 14 (1971).
3. A useful start in this direction has been made in GATT SITMES IN INTERNA-
TIONAL TRADE, No. I, INDUSTRIAL POLLUTION CONTROL AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE (1971)
[hereinafter GATT STUDY].
4. 61 Stat. pt. 5, at A3 (1947), T.LA.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194. For the current
text of GATT, see IV GATT, BAsic INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS 1 (1969)
[hereinafter BISD].
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the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).4 It will also
bring into focus the economic arguments from the standpoint of the
industrialized countries for effective multinational coordination of
national pollution-control efforts.
B. A Note on Methodology
Economists, like lawyers, attempt to distill relevant facts from a
given matrix, and to arrive at defensible conclusions based on those
facts. But the facts that concern the economist change constantly as
economic forces interact. His problem is one of making predictions
that will be valid despite the changes of facts. To do this requires
the selection of a few key elements-the relevant facts-that can
serve as indicators for the direction the others will take. This usually
means that the facts must be idealized in order to give them general
validity in as many real world variations as possible. The point has
been made by a noted economist:
[An economic] hypothesis is important if it "explains" much by
little, that is, if it abstracts the common and crucial elements from
the mass of complex and detailed circumstances surrounding the
phenomena to be explained and permits valid predictions on the
basis of them alone. To be important, therefore, a hypothesis must
be descriptively false in its assumptions; it takes account of, and ac-
counts for, none of the many other attendant circumstances, since
its very success shows them to be irrelevant for the phenomena to
be explained.5
The discussion below does not purport to set forth any funda-
mentally new economic hypothesis. It does, however, adopt the
methodology of positive economics in order to isolate essential ele-
ments of the pollution-control problem. Because pollution-control
policies are still in an evolutionary stage, there would be limited use-
fulness in an examination of the probable effects of existing pollution-
control measures in, for example, the United States. More important
is an attempt to distill key pollution-control variables facing any
industrialized nation and to assess their implications. Consequently
the discussion will make use of a hypothetical country with an epit-
omized pollution problem. Moreover, the analysis will deal with
pollution controls that do not reflect all the imperfections to which
such measures are subject in practice.
5. M. Fhmw u , The Methodology of Positive Economics, in EssAYS iN Posrrrv
ECONOmICS 14-15 (1953).
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C. Marginal Pricing and Pollution Control
Optimal pollution control is one aspect of the problem of making
efficient use of natural resources. A brief exposition of the manner
in which pollution control fits into the theory of efficient resource
utilization is basic to the discussion to follow.6
The relevant theoretical condition for maximum efficiency con-
cerns the relationship of marginal costs of goods produced with their
marginal values.7 At any given set of prices, it is a necessary (though
not in itself sufficient) condition for maximum efficiency that the
marginal cost of producing each commodity be equal to its marginal
value. This means that the cost of producing the last unit (the mar-
ginal cost) must equal the value of that unit to consumers, indicated
by the price they are willing to pay for it. If this equality does not
hold, resources could theoretically be shifted in such a way that
greater efficiency---greater net product for no higher cost-could be
achieved. For example, if the marginal cost of an item exceeds its
marginal value (price), the last units of that commodity are not
worth the resource cost of producing them; greater efficiency would
be attained by shifting resources out of that line of production into
another, until the marginal cost is reduced to the level of the price.
The divergence between marginal cost and marginal value arises
in the pollution-control context because the true marginal social
cost of the commodity (including the cost to society of net pollution
damage) is not reflected in the marginal private cost to the producer.
Efficient use of resources occurs only when marginal social cost is
equated with marginal social value. Consequently when marginal
private cost of production is equated with marginal value, marginal
social cost exceeds marginal value by the amount of pollution damage
-if pollution damage is the only cause of divergence. The result
is a pollution-caused "external diseconomy."8
6. The present discussion bypasses significant questions of economic equity, such
as the allocation of pollution-control burdens among segments of the international,
national, or local community. The value judgments inherent in these questions would
influence the choice among pollution-control approaches outlined in text accompanying
notes 19-25 infra, and would affect the shape taken by any international pollution-
control regime. The discussion assumes, in effect, that these value judgments can be
made to the relative satisfaction of members of the community.
7. See generally J. MEADE, TRADE AND WELFARE 10-67 (1955). In the pollution-control
context, see A. KNzrsE & B. BowER, MANAGING WATER QuALITY: ECONOMIcs, TECHNOL-
OGY, INsrrrTUoNs 75-84 (1968); E. MIsnAN, supra note 1, at 45-52.
8. Economists have devoted considerable attention to the problem of bringing ex-
ternal diseconomies into the pricing system, focusing primarily on use of tax-subsidy
schemes. The pioneering work was A. PIGou, THE ECONOMxCS OF WELFARE (4th ed.
1932). See also A. KNEESE & B. BowER, supra note 7, at 97-142; J. WfADE, supra note 7,
[Vol. 70:859
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A divergence could occur from a number of causes in addition to
pollution, including taxes, tariffs, and monopolistic pricing. As we
have noted, the attainment of maximum efficiency would require
that all such divergences be eliminated. But it is virtually incon-
ceivable that they could all be removed, even in a single country.
This raises a problem of the "second best": Given that all diver-
gences in the economy cannot be eliminated, the second best solution
is not necessarily the removal of those that can be.9 If, for example,
the effect of removing some divergences were to alter relative prices
so that demand is increased for goods bearing higher marginal costs
than marginal values, over-all economic efficiency could be reduced. 10
Common sense and scientific opinion agree that something must
be done about external costs imposed by industrial pollution. It
would be most incongruous if economic theory were compelled to
demur on the ground that such a course of action may not be the
second best solution if all other divergences cannot be removed. If
the divergence being corrected were slight, such a demurrer might
indeed be forthcoming. But the greater the divergence, and the more
pervasive its correction, the more likely it is that the net result will
be a welfare gain even though other divergences remain.1 Thus, if
damage from industrial pollution in a given country is widespread
and presently or potentially severe, a policy that seeks effectively to
at 30, 237; Burrows, On External Costs and the Visible Arm of the Law, 22 Oxroan
EcoN. PAPaS (ns.) 89, 50-51 (1970); Turvey, On Divergences Between Social Cost and
Private Cost, 30 EcoNoM=CA (ns.) 809 (1963).
The Pigovian analysis, with its focus on equating private and sodal costs, has been
challenged in Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & EcoN. 1 (1960). Given the
existence of transaction costs that prevent private parties from reaching bargains that
will internalize social costs, it appears that Professor Coase's objections are less con-
cerned with the concept of private-social cost divergence than with the problem of
measuring net social cost in such a way that the value of production is maximized.
See id. at 41-42. One aspect of this problem is discussed briefly in note 19 infra. Pro-
fessor Coase's article contains more than the challenge to Pigou, and repays reading
by any lawyer interested in environmental problems. For further discussion of the
Coase approach, see Burrows, supra at 41-46, 49-51; Krier, The Pollution Problem and
Legal Institutions: A Conceptual Overview, 18 UCLA L. R-v. 429, 433-38, 444-49 (1971);
Mishan, Pareto Optimality and the Law, 19 OxroRD EcoN. PAPERS (n.s.) 255, 278-80
(1967); Mishan, Reflections on Recent Developments in the Concept of External Effects,
31 CAN. J. ECON. &c POL. S. 3, 29-32 (1965). For a thoughtful survey, see Mishan, The
Postwar Literature on Externalities: An Interpretative Essay, 9 J. ECON. Lar. 1 (1971).
9. See Lipsey S: Lancaster, The General Theory of the Second Best, 24 Ray. oF EcoN.
STuDrEs 11 (1956); Mishan, Second Thoughts on Second Best, 14 OxroRD ECON. PAPERs
(n.s.) 205, 213 (1962).
10. Cf. J. MAEmg, supra note 7, at 244-5a.
11. See id. at 223-25, 565-66; Mishan, 14 OxFoRD ECON. PAPERs (u.s.) 205, supra
note 9, at 214.
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eliminate the pollution divergence throughout the economy must
be presumed to provide a net domestic efficiency gain.
The discussion below accepts this proposition, and for expositional
reasons proceeds as though the pollution divergence were the only
one existing in the country. It deals with pollution-control systems
designed to achieve maximum attainable economic efficiency by at-
tempting, in so far as is possible, to equate marginal social costs roughly
with marginal values. Framing the analysis in these terms permits
conclusions to be drawn about the effect of intensified pollution
control on consumer prices and output in terms of reasonably well
understood behavioral principles of profit maximization. It has the
further advantage of permitting the relevant economic variables to
be analyzed diagrammatically. The exposition for a nonmarginal
system would have to rely simply on a priori reasoning.
The conclusions reached are of general validity, even for systems
that do not set standards by reference to marginal costs, so long as
it is accepted that pollution control will raise costs at any given level
of output and that net pollution damage will in general increase
with increasing commodity output. Pollution-control methods are
quite diverse. They include treatment of wastes before discharge to
the environment, storage of wastes to give natural cleansing pro-
cesses an opportunity to work, recycling, commercial use of by-
products, alteration of basic inputs or production processes, and
reduction in the volume of commodity output.1 2 Some of these are,
or may eventually become, cost-saving. For the foreseeable future,
however, marginal and total cost for any level of commodity output
may be expected to increase in the short run in virtually every in-
dustry encompassed by the pollution-control scheme."'
12. See, e.g., A. KNansE & B. BowmR, supra note 7, at 105. Optimal over-all pollution-
control policy involves public as well as private pollution-controlling activities. Al-
though these public projects, such as sewage treatment, affect industrial pollution costs,
our focus will be on pollution controls that have a more direct impact on business costs.
13. It is difficult to find data dealing with specific marginal costs of pollution con-
trol. It is reasonable to assume, however, that total pollution-control costs are related
to quantities of output. One noteworthy cost study is ENvIRoNMENTAL PROTECTION
AGENCY, Tim EcONOMICS OF CLEAN AnR, S. Doc. No. 92-6, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
It estimates the annual cost in the United States of compliance with the federal Clean
Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857-58a (1970), by fiscal year 1976 for the control of air pollution
from industrial processes, alone, at over 1 billion dollars (in addition to capital invest-
ment costs), resulting in an increase in the general price level attributable to that
source of about 0.14%. Id. at 1-7 to 1-9. The price estimate assumes that some of the
increased annual costs will be absorbed rather than passed along to consumers. The
cost figures do not include amounts for control of air pollution from fuel consumption
or solid waste disposal, or for control of water pollution. The price level figure does
include industries, such as real estate, not producing internationally traded goods, for
[Vol. 70:859
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D. Assumptions
Let us assume that an economically developed country, A, is
faced with a widespread and still inadequately resolved pollution
problem to which most of its major industries contribute. This
occurs in many cases as a by-product of production processes; in
other cases it is caused by the consumer products themselves.
Country A is determined to carry out an efficient industrial pol-
lution-control program. In the absence of an appropriate inter-
national control regime, A must face the possibility that its program
will raise domestic industrial costs more than will the pollution-
control programs of its major trading partners. In order to demon-
strate the effect if that occurs, the discussion in part II assumes that
industries in A's major trading partners do not, in general, incur
pollution-control costs equivalent to those incurred in A. 14
In addition to its pollution-control goals, A has economic objec-
tives that it does not wish to abandon. These include the prevention
of recession and maintenance of international competitiveness on
the part of its enterprises. The economic objectives have several
motivations, including particularly the desire to provide employ-
ment for domestic labor, avoidance of the socioeconomic problems
of readjustment for workers and firms in import-competing (or ex-
porting) sectors of the economy, and the inability even under emerg-
which estimated price increases are negligible. Id. at 4-130. Thus, the estimated 0.14%
price increase attributable to this source subsumes a greater increase for internationally
tradable goods. Price estimates used in the study did not explicitly take into account the
effect of import competition. Compare GATT SrTUY, supra note 3, at 25 (breakdown by
industrial sectors of projected price increases if major air-polluting industries meet
standards of the Clean Air Act; median increase 0.80%); SrTUDS FOR r m COUNCIL ON
ENViRONwENTAL QUALrrY, DEPT. oF COMMERCE, AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,
Tsn ECONOMIC IMPACT OF POLLUTION CONTROL 10 (1972) [hereinafter ECONOMIC IMPACT
STuDIES] (price increases attributable to control of air and water pollution up to 10%
by 1976 in eleven major United States industries).
See also CEQ 1971 REPORT, supra note 1, at 110-18 (projected annual and cumulative
outlays for water and air pollution control in the United States); FEDERAL WATER
POLLTI~rON CONTROL ADMINISTRATION, I THE CosT OF CLEAN WATER AND ITS ECONOMIC
IMPACT 144-51 (1969) hereinafter THE Cost OF CLEAN WATER] (projection of costs of
treatment of industrial wastes entering United States waterways); A. KNEESE & B. BoWER,
supra note 7, at 158-64 (relatively modest, but positive, projected cost in terms of value
of output for industrial water pollution control in the Delaware estuary); THE PROTc-
TION OF Tm ENvIRoNmENT, CmNo. No. 4373, at 10 (1970) (costs of air pollution control
for selected industrial processes in the United Kingdom, 1958-1968).
14. It is most unlikely that costs would rise uniformly in all-or even in any two-.
pollution-controlling industrialized countries. The disparities would result from differ-
ences in the relative magnitude of industrial pollution among the countries, in the
stringency of each country's pollution controls, and in the age of existing industrial
equipment. See GATT STUDY, supra note 3, at 7-9.
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ing international monetary arrangements to ignore A's balance of
payments.15 Country A is also a party to GATT.16
It is necessary to compress the various abatement approaches A
might take into a limited number of categories, each with its own
distinguishing features. 7 In keeping with the methodology discussed
above, the descriptions are in terms of optimal systems and ignore
most operating details as well as problems of administration.'
(1) The pollution tax approach. Country A may attempt to inte-
grate pollution costs into costs of production by imposing a tax that is
roughly equated to the (marginal) net cost to society of each firm's
activities in excess of the private cost to the firm.'9 The tax would
15. It is probable that a system of relatively fixed exchange rates (reflecting the
adjustments emanating from the 1971 monetary crisis) will continue to be the prevail-
ing international monetary arrangement for at least the next few years, when any effects
of internationally uncoordinated pollution-control efforts would begin to manifest
themselves. Widening of the band around parity (within which exchange rates are
permitted to fluctuate) is the most significant of the emerging monetary changes for
purposes of the present discussion. Such an arrangement, however, still involves rela-
tively fixed exchange rates, and does not eliminate the need to attend to balance-of-
payments considerations. If the widened-band arrangement is to be more than ad hoc,
there must be an amendment to the Articles of Agreement of the International Mone-
tary Fund. See Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, Dec. 27,
1945, arts. IV, §§ 3-4, XVII, 60 Stat. 1401 (1946), T.A.S. No. 1501, 2 U.N.TS. 39. Cf.
note 184 infra.
16. As of late 1971, there were eighty contracting parties to GATT. See GATT
Press Release No. 1091 (1971); N.Y. Times, Oct. 19, 1971, at 68, col. 7 (city ed.). Several
other nations were applying it de facto. See GATT Secretariat, The Most-Favoured.
Nation Clause in GATT, 4 J. Woarn TIADE L. 791 (1970).
17. The categories are discussed in J. DAmrS, POLLUTION, PROPERTY & PRICES 81-84
(1968); Goldman, Pollution: The Mess Around Us, in CONTROLLING PoLmuuro: TnIE
ECONOMICS OF A CLANRER AmsnucA 3, 20-38 (M. Goldman ed. 1967); Krier, supra note 8,
at 459-75.
18. For discussion of some of the difficulties glossed over here, see, e.g., A. KNEEsE &
B. BowER, supra note 7, at 109-24; Crocker, Some Economics of Air Pollution Control,
8 NATURAL RsouRcEs J. 236 (1968); Davis & Whinston, On Externalities, Information
and the Government-Assisted Invisible Hand, 33 ECONOMICA (ns.) 303 (1966); Kneese,
Economics and the Quality of the Environment-Some Empirical Experiences, in SociAL
ScIENcFS AND THE ENVmONMETrr 165 (M. Garnsey & J. Hibbs ed. 1967). Cf. K. KA'r,
SOaIAL Cosrs OF BusiNEss ENTERPRIsE 21-23, 63-66 (2d ed. 1963); Mishan, The Spillover
Enemy, 33 ENcouNma, No. 6, at 3, 6 (Dec. 1969); Plott, Externalities and Corrective
Taxes, 33 EcoNoMIcA (n.s.) 84 (1966).
19. Marginal net cost to society (S) is (1) the price paid by the purchaser of the
last item (P); plus (2) the marginal gross external damage (D) from its production
(including estimated damage to such societal values as those concerned with aesthetics
and recreation); less (3) any excess of the value of the pollution-affected resources (in-
cluding all factors of production) in their best alternative use (VA), over their remain-
ing pollution-affected value in their existing use (V_). Cf. A. KNrs & B. BowEa, supra
note 7, at 81-82; Coase, supra note 8, at 4-6. In algebraic form, S - P + D - (V4
V.), where (VA - V) > 0. As indicated in the text, the tax (T) would equal S minus
the private marginal cost to the firm. In a world in which the only economic distortion
is caused by pollution, the private marginal cost would equal the price (P). See text
following note 7 supra and Figure 1 infra. Thus:
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not be levied on any firm that eliminates the excess net cost of its
activities. This would give each firm an incentive to reduce pollution
to the point at which further reduction would cost more than the
amount of the tax.20 Since the tax would be equated to net damage,
further reduction of pollution would cause a greater drain on so-
ciety's resources than would the remaining pollution. Tax proceeds
would be used for centralized pollution control, or perhaps in some
cases to recompense members of society peculiarly damaged by in-
dustrial pollution. Whenever possible the tax would be imposed
directly on such elements of, or inputs to, the production process as
are responsible for external costs. It might also be imposed on the
incorporation into the final product of materials or designs that pose
a pollution hazard, at least in so far as the product is likely to be
used domestically rather than exported.21
(2) The legal regulation approach. Country A could attempt to
achieve essentially the same result accomplished by the tax approach
by mandatory (nontax) legislation applied directly or through ad-
ministrative bodies.2 2 Firms would be required to prevent pollution
T-S-P
T =[P+ D-(VA-V )]-P
T = D- (A-VE)
where (VA- VF) >0.
If (VA - VV) < 0, it is eliminated from the formula, so T = D in such a case.
This approach would not involve elimination of all waste discharge and other ex-
ternal effects. To do so would be to ignore the purifying properties of the environment,
thus wasting resources. For elaboration, see, e.g., Ogden, Economic Analysis of Air
Pollution, 42 LAND ECON. 137, 189 (1966); Ruff, The Economic Common Sense of Pol-
lution, TnE PuBLic INrmur, No. 19, Spring 1970, at 69; Turvey, Side Effects of Re-
source Use, in EuvmoaNsm rrAL QUA= iN A GRowING EcoNoMY 47, 49 (H. Jarrett ed.
1966).
20. A tax scheme to regulate water pollution is presently in effect in the Ruhr area
in West Germany. See A. KNEEsE & B. BowER, supra note 7, at 237-53. Some municipal-
ities in the United States apply surcharges to industries that make particularly heavy
demands on municipal sewage facilities. See 3 THE Cosr or CLEM WATER, supra note
13, at 29-80. President Nixon has proposed a tax on lead used in gasoline and a charge
on the emission of sulphur oxides. See H.R. Doc. No. 92-46, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 3-4
(1971). These arrangements, however, do not attempt to equate marginal costs with
marginal values.
21. Export of the pollution-engendering product would also export the pollution.
If we assume a parochial pollution-control outlook on the part of A, there would be
no point in applying a domestic tax in such a case unless there is also a pollution
problem arising from the production process. See text accompanying notes 49-50 infra.
22. Legal regulation is the approach most widely adopted in the United States and
United Kingdom. See, e.g., Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 38 U.S.C. §§ 1151-75
(1970); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857-58a (1970). For the United Kingdom, see Rivers
(Prevention of Pollution) Act of 1951, 14 & 15 Geo. 6, c. 64, § 2, supplemented by Clean
Rivers (Estuaries and Tidal Waters) Act of 1960, 8 & 9 Eliz. 2, c. 54, § 1, and by Rivers
(Prevention of Pollution) Act of 1961, 9 & 10 Elki. 2, c. 50, § 1; Clean Air Act of 1956,
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damage to a point determined by a legislative or regulatory body
to be such that the cost of further control exceeds the net cost to
society of further pollution from that source. If pollution control fell
short of that point, the firm would be liable to members of the
public-or to the government in behalf of the public-much as it
would under the tax approach.23 The optimal regulatory scheme
would not specify the means firms 'must use to "internalize" pollution
costs. It would restrict itself to setting forth the required results and
leave it to firms to select the least expensive ways to achieve them.
(3) The production subsidy approach. Country A may offer to sub-
sidize private measures to prevent pollution damage. In order to
form the basis for a comprehensive attempt to control pollution,
the subsidies would have to be more ambitious than tax write-offs
for investment in pollution-abatement equipment.24 They would
have to provide an incentive to firms to eliminate net damage by
the least costly available means. Thus, the optimal subsidies would
be available for pollution control that eliminates the excess social
(over private) cost of the pollution that would be engendered by firms
in the absence of the pollution-control scheme. Subsidies would be
based on marginal costs and would not be tied to the adoption of
designated pollution-control methods.
25
For diagrammatic exposition, we assume that for each firm or
industry there is a constant ratio of pollutant discharge per unit of
commodity output, that each additional unit of pollutant results
in a net amount of damage to society equal to the net damage from
the previous unit, and that these conditions do not change over time.
Let us further assume that there are constant returns to scale and
that we are not dealing with a domestic monopoly. These assumptions
are for convenience only; their absence would not invalidate the
conclusions reached.
4 & 5 Eliz. 2, c. 52, §§ 1-6, supplemented by Clean Air Act of 1968, c. 62, §§ 1-4. See
generally Krier, supra note 8, at 459-67, and references cited therein.
23. It is generally thought that it is more difficult to approach actual correlation
between social and private costs with the legal regulation approach than with taxes.
See J. DALES, supra note 17, at 85-86; A. KNEEsE & B. Bowna, supra note 7, at 135-39;
Mills, Economic Incentives in Air-Pollution Control, in THE ECONOics OF Am PoLLu-
TION 40, 44, 47-48 (H. Wolozin ed. 1966).
24. Several states in the United States offer tax exemptions for pollution-control
expenditures. See McNulty, State Tax Incentives To Fight Pollution, 56 A.BA.J. 747
(1970). Similarly, in the United Kingdom investment grants are available to cover a
portion of such expenditures. See U.K. MINisTRY OF HousING & LOCAL GOVERNMENT,
REPORT OF THE WORKING PARTY ON SEWAGE DISPosAL, TAKEN FOR GRANTE 43 (1970).
25. See A. KNEEsE & B. BowEm, supra note 7, at 101-09, 175-78.
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At the macroeconomic level, we assume that the government of A
will utilize fiscal and monetary policy to prevent aggregate demand
in A from falling below its prepollution-control level, and that this
can be done with relative success in the short run. Such a govern-
mental policy may create tensions with the pollution-control objec-
tive, which might be best served by reductions in demand for some
economically significant pollution-engendering goods. It is possible,
however, to maintain aggregate demand while discouraging demand
for selected items. That the government of A would try to do so
seems realistic, since present-day governments in industrialized coun-
tries are generally unwilling to permit aggregate demand to fall
significantly. It would be aided in its efforts by the inevitable in-
crease in demand for products designed to control pollution.
It is important to keep in mind that what follows is a partial
equilibrium analysis, necessarily limited to the pollution-control
aspect of a complex over-all economic situation, which in the early
1970's includes elements of inflation and reviving protectionism. The
impact of these phenomena will be noted as the discussion proceeds,
but they cannot be analyzed here in detail.
II. ECONOMIC DisINcENTIVEs AND TRADE POLICY
A. The Pollution Tax or Equivalent Domestic Legal Regulation
1. Microeconomic Disincentives
Figure 1 illustrates the situation facing a relatively large domestic
industry that competes with imports but does not export the com-
modity concerned.26 Pollution occurs as a result of the production
process in the depicted industry, but the commodity produced does
not pose a serious pollution problem in its consumption. The do-
mestic output of the commodity is measured along the horizontal
axis, and price (including cost to the industry) along the vertical. MV
is the marginal value to consumers in A of the commodity produced
by the domestic industry; PMC is the private marginal cost curve for
the industry before A intensifies its pollution-control efforts; SMC1
is the social marginal cost curve for the industry if a new tax equiva-
lent to the marginal net pollution damage (net social cost in excess
of private cost) from rising output is applied and firms do nothing
26. The diagram was suggested by a less detailed one in A. KNEE & B. BoWER,
supra note 7, Figure 16, at 101. It does not illustrate fixed costs for pollution control,
since they are less significant for the determination of equilibrium prices and outputs
than are marginal costs.
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to avoid the tax;27 and SMC 2 is the social marginal cost curve if each
firm adopts the least expensive means available to avoid causing any
net pollution damage from its activities. The MV line may be viewed
as a short-term demand curve in country A for the domestic com-
modity, and the various MC lines as short-term domestic industry
supply curves.
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equilibrium positions for the domestic industry before and after A's
pollution control intensification. As shown, the demand for domestic
production of the commodity is not infinitely elastic, for MV is not
horizontal. This means that the quantity of the commodity offered
27. The diagram illustrates the effect of both the tax and legal regulation approaches.
For the sake of convenience the exposition is in terms of the tax approach, and is
correlated with legal regulation in text following note 35 infra. For the definition of
net social cost, see note 19 supra.
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to the market in A by the domestic industry affects the price. This
reflects any or all of three conditions: (1) reduced competition from
imports because of existing trade barriers; (2) imperfect substitutabil-
ity between the domestic product and competing imports, so that
import competition does not fully prevent domestic firms, in the
aggregate, from affecting prices in A;2 1 and/or (3) less than infinite
elasticity of supply of imports in the short term, so that a reduction in
domestic output (or an increase in its price) could not be wholly off-
set by new imports without a rise in the price of imports.2 9
Firms in the domestic industry are profit-maximizers in the usual
sense, 0 so that they arrive at the point at which the effective marginal
cost to each of them equals the price.31 Before any pollution-control
intensification occurs, the domestic industry produces an output of X
units of the commodity at price P, reflecting the point of intersection
between PMC (supply) and MV (demand). Total domestic demand
for the commodity (including imports) is X, with the difference be-
tween X and X representing the domestic demand for imports at
price P. If a pollution tax is applied to production,3 2 and if the firms
in the industry choose to pay it rather than to make further pollu-
tion-control expenditures, marginal cost would reflect pollution
damage and the supply curve would shift to SMCi. Domestic output
28. This does not necessarily mean that domestic firms consciously fix prices, or that
there is a domestic monopoly. The reference is simply to the aggregate effect of the
(presumably independent) acts of domestic firms in the industry.
29. Over the long run, if the domestic price remains above world prices (adjusted
for existing trade barriers and transportation costs) for substitutable goods, the usual
assumption in the absence of new trade barriers is that foreign supply capacity would
be induced to grow. This would bring prices in A back down as imports increased.
Thus, the third point above may be limited to the time period within which such
conditions as lack of technology, of capital, or of market flexibility prevent foreign
competition from stepping into the breach.
30. With imperfect competition, firms may administer prices on a cost-markup
basis or by some other rule of thumb. For an empirical study, see Lanzillotti, Pricing
Objectives in Large Companies, 48 Ar. EcoN. REv. 921 (1958). This does not mean
that they ignore demand conditions, and is not inconsistent with the concept of profit
maximization based on marginal cost and demand. Firms behave as though they
were equating marginal costs and marginal revenues, whether or not their decision-
makers go through that mental process. See G. ACaLEY, MACROECONOMic THEORY 455
(1961); M. FRimMAN, supra note 5, at 15, 21-28.
31. The downward-sloping demand curve applies to the domestic industry as a
whole. In the absence of monopoly, each firm in the industry faces a horizontal de-
mand curve: its output, alone, does not affect the price. If there were a monopoly, the
downward-sloping demand curve would apply to the individual firm, and the price
would be set above marginal cost. See generally G. STIGLEa, THE THEORY or PRICE
195-99 (3d ed. 1966).
82. We are dealing with a production tax, rather than a tax on consumption of
goods in A. For discussion of relevant distinctions between consumption and produc-
tion taxes, see text accompanying notes 49-50 infra.
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would be reduced to X1 and price would rise to P1.P As the diagram
is drawn, however, it is cheaper at output X1 for firms in the industry
to eliminate net pollution cost to society (in excess of private cost)
than to pay the tax, since the SMC2 curve is below SMC at output X1.
They would thus make the expenditures to avoid the tax, and would
expand output in the aggregate to X2, at price P2. For the present,
we assume that no new import barriers are erected, so domestic out-
put and price would not rise above these levels.
In the absence of a shift in the MV (demand) curve, the precise
locations of X2 on the output axis and of P2 on the price axis depend
on the rates of change in marginal costs and marginal value, repre-
sented by the slopes of the various curves. Those slopes will not
necessarily be as shown in the diagram. In particular, the slope of
SMC--the rate of increase of the cost of pollution-damage avoid-
ance-at any given point might vary widely from that shown. De-
pending on its rate of increase, final equilibrium output (X2) could
be as low as X1, but not lower; if SMC2 rose steeply to the left of the
intersection between SMC, and MV, firms would stop paying the
marginal cost of net pollution-damage avoidance when SMC2 crosses
SMC1, and would then pay the tax and expand output until the
SMC1 -MV intersection is reached (at output Xl). X2 could not be as
far to the right as X, so long as effective pollution control results in
increased marginal costs. This would be so even if SMC2 did not rise
relative to PMC; it need only be anywhere above PMC. Similarly,
P2 could not be higher than P1, and would have to be higher than P
unless demand for the domestic industry's output is infinitely elastic
(i.e., unless MV is horizontal). 4 This demonstrates the strong likeli-
hood that effective unilateral pollution control by means of taxes ap-
plied to a large domestic industry will result in an increased domestic
price for its product and reduced output.
33. The production tax would not directly affect prices of goods imported into A.
This inhibits the ability of firms in A to pass along the amount of the tax. A con.
sumption tax (which might be applied to the use of pollution-engendering commodities
in A) would directly affect imports and could more readily be passed on to the
purchaser. See generally A. HART, P. KENEN & A. ENTINE, MONEY, DEBT AND ECONOMIC
Acrxvry 258 (4th ed. 1969); Krauss, The Issue of Border Tax Adjustments, 3 J. WoRLD
TADE L. 553, 560 (1969).
34. These limits would not apply if the MV curve has shifted. It could shift, for
example, as a result of the income-redistribution effect of the pollution-control scheme,
or because of other income changes (including those resulting from the effect on real
incomes of higher aggregate prices). If MV did shift, the limits for X2 and P2 would
also shift. We have assumed, however, that the government of A would act to keep
aggregate demand roughly stable in the short run. This would be likely to forestall
any substantial shift of MV.
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Figure 1 also demonstrates the potential increase in imports of
a given commodity resulting from intensified pollution control, on
our assumption that the government will act to prevent aggregate
domestic demand from falling in the short run, even though prices
increase. If the price increase for the commodity depicted in Figure 1
is not substantially out of proportion with increases for goods that
consumers might substitute for it, total domestic demand for the
depicted commodity could be expected to remain approximately at
X. The share supplied by imports has now increased from X-" to2- 85
If A uses the legal regulation approach keyed to marginal costs
and values, the analysis is similar. In the optimal case, the only dif-
ference for our purposes would be that a legislative or regulatory
body would estimate the point at which the cost of further control
exceeds the net cost to society of further pollution (i.e., the point at
which SMC2 intersects SMC1). If that point is reached within the
limits of profitable production (before SMC2 crosses MV), firms would
be liable to members of the public-or to the government in behalf
of the public-for the net pollution cost of further production. In
effect, they would proceed along SMCI from that point. The result
would be the same as in the case of the pollution tax.
It is important to note that the increase in imports suggested by
Figure 1 would be probable even if the rise in marginal costs in the
domestic industry were relatively minor. International trade flows
since World War II have become highly sensitive even to small
changes in incomes, costs, and prices as natural and artificial trade
barriers have receded.36 This is a matter of considerable significance
to any discussion of the economic effects of comprehensive unilateral
pollution control, in light of the strong likelihood that costs will in-
crease when effective pollution-control measures are applied.37 Excess
35. Of course, aggregate demand might be maintained while demand for a given
commodity falls. A commodity heavily laden with pollution-control costs may have a
relatively pollution-free substitute in which case demand for it would shift downward.
Imports, however, may still command an increased share of the (diminished) market
for such a commodity. Cf. CEQ 1971 REPORT, supra note 1, at 132.
It is noteworthy that Figure 1 could also illustrate the reduction in exports of a
domestic export industry, or of the profit-maximizing export divisions of firms in an
industry, after imposition of the production tax or regulation. The MV curve would
be the foreign demand curve facing A's producers, and the reduced output would
represent reduced exports.
36. See R. CooPER, THE ECONOMICS OF INTERDEPENDENCE: ECONOMIC POLICY IN THE
ATLANTIC COMMUNITY 76-77 (1968); GATT STUDy, supra note 3, at 11. For discussion of
the forces leading to this result, see R. COOPER, supra at 63-76.
37. This means, for example, that projections of relatively modest cost for some
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capacity would develop in the domestic industry, in terms of man-
power as well as physical plant. Shifts in demand among domestic
industries (away from products of high-pollution industries and
toward low-pollution substitutes as well as toward products specifi-
cally designed to control pollution in the production or consumption
of other products) may prevent the general level of domestic econo-
mic activity from falling sharply. But if high-pollution industries
are significant exporters or import competitors, the aggregate balance
of trade may suffer.A8
2. Possible Macroeconomic Disincentives
The macroeconomic consequences if pollution-control measures
affect most import-competing and exporting industries, assuming A
takes steps to ensure that the level of aggregate domestic demand does
not fall, may be shown with the aid of a simple diagram in which the
existence of a capital market is ignored and the role of money in
the economy is emphasized. In Figure 2, the domestic price level
for home-produced goods is measured along the horizontal axis, and
the domestic supply of money along the vertical. Everywhere on
the LL line, domestic monetary conditions are in equilibrium in the
sense that the demand for money equals the supply. Along XX and
X 1X1, the domestic and foreign demand for domestic goods equals
the supply of domestic goods. XX represents equilibrium in the
market for domestic goods before intensification of pollution control,
X 1X 1 afterward. Along BB, the price level and money supply are
such that the balance of trade is zero-the aggregate value of imports
equals the aggregate value of exports.89
industrial pollution control-as in A. KNEM & B. BowER, supra note 7, at 161 n.10-
cannot be taken to resolve the economic questions surrounding efficient pollution control.
38. Compare CEQ 1971 REPORT, supra note 1, at 152-33, which seeks to minimize
this risk for the United States by indicating that the major polluting industries ac-
count for only about 19% of the value of United States import competition and a like
percentage of the value of exports. These percentages, which are not insignificant, are
pre-pollution control and do not take account of all industries facing foreign competi-
tion that have significant pollution-control costs. See ECONOMIC IMPACr STuDiE, supra
note 13, at 328-29 (projected decline in United States trade balance of 2 or 3 billion
dollars by 1980 if the Government acts to maintain domestic demand in the face of
pollution-control costs and United States trading partners do not incur price increases
from environmental regulations abroad; the decline would be less severe, of course,
with foreign price increases).
39. Figure 2 was suggested by a more rigorously defined diagram in R. MUNDELL,
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 118, Figure 8-3 (1968). Professor Mundell's diagram, however,
does not purport to demonstrate the effect of a change in domestic equilibrium. Cf. id.
at 217-32. For the derivation of the diagram, see id. at 114-19. It assumes relatively
fixed exchange rates. See note 15 supra.
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If we assume that country A was in balance-of-trade equilibrium
before it intensified its pollution-control efforts, the initial aggregate
price level would be P and the money supply M. If pollution control
results in price increases that are validated by A's monetary policy
designed to maintain a supply of money just equal to the demand
(and-though this is not necessarily the same thing-to maintain the
aggregate level of demand for goods), a new short-run equilibrium
in the goods market may be reached at the intersection between
X1X1 (representing a higher aggregate price level at which demand
and supply in the goods market are equalized) and LL. The price of
domestic goods will have risen to P1, and the money supply to M1.
But it is clear from the diagram that these levels are too high for
balance-of-trade equilibrium, since the intersection between X1X 1
and LL is to the right of, and above, the BB line.40 If there were no
40. If country A is large enough so that its demand and supply conditions affect
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capital market, country A's balance of payments would be in deficit.
With a capital market, the government of A might be able to
attract short-term capital by interest rate increases (though this would
work at cross purposes with the objective of maintaining demand
for goods), and some long-term capital may flow in to finance new
investment in pollution-control equipment. Whether these potential
inflows would offset the trade deficit cannot be determined in the
abstract. If not, and if A remained committed to a policy of maintain-
ing aggregate demand (a policy that props up demand for imports),
there would be a balance-of-payments problem.41 If there are exog-
enous inflationary forces at work in A's economy to a stronger degree
than in A's trading partners, the balance-of-payments problem would
be exacerbated; conversely, it would be ameliorated if the rate of in-
flation is greater in the trading partners.
B. Trade Measures
The discussion to this point suggests that, in the absence of inter-
national regulation to achieve some rough measure of pollution-
control cost-equalization among developed countries, there are
significant deterrents to optimal industrial pollution control through
production taxes or legal regulation in an open, industrialized econ-
omy.42 It remains to be seen, however, whether unilateral policy
measures could effectively mitigate these economic disincentives.
Devaluation would be appropriate for maintaining external balance
if the price change in A is general and if the price differential be-
tween A and its trading partners is expected to be long-term; more-
over, there are indications that the political barriers to devaluation
world prices, BB could shift to the right. There is no guarantee, however, that it
would shift far enough to coincide with the intersection between XX, and LL.
41. For a discussion of the mechanisms of balance-of-payments adjustment, see
A. HART, P. KENtEN & A. Etroti, supra note 33, at 325-36. Cf. R. BALDWiN, NoNTARi F
DisroRnoNs OF INTERNATIOxAL TartE 91-92 (1970), discussing the adjustment mechanism
when taxes on all domestic products are increased. The balance-of-payments problem
would arise even under the emerging changes in the international monetary system,
though its severity could be relieved by the wider band around parity and by a
greater willingness to alter par values than has heretofore existed.
42. An additional economic disincentive to effective pollution control in the
industrialized countries may result from the combination of relative international
mobility of capital (despite controls on capital movements in some countries) and
the appealing prospect to entrepreneurs of low pollution-control costs in many develop-
ing countries. Cf. R. COOPER, supra note 36, at 98-99; GATT STrUY, supra note 3, at 11,
23. Industrialized countries, though sympathetic to the felt needs of developing nations
for capital and technology, will be reluctant to risk large-scale displacement of domestic
industrial activities-and possible unemployment problems-as a result of their pol.
lution-control efforts. If such problems arise, new capital controls may well appear.
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are receding.43 But if the trade imbalance were expected to be short-
term, or if new political barriers to devaluation appear, import sur-
charges would be attractive to national decision-makers-as the events
of August 15, 1971, in the United States have shown. 44
If the price change in A were confined primarily to a few in-
dustries, or if A's pre-existing payments position were sufficiently
strong, devaluation would be inappropriate on economic as well as
political grounds. There would be a strong temptation, however,
to adopt selective import duties or quotas to protect specially affected
industries. Protective pressures already exist, of course, in some
industrialized countries. Consequently, even in the event that uni-
lateral pollution control would pose no balance-of-payments prob-
lems for country A, it is necessary to consider the effect of new trade
measures intended to mitigate the economic disincentives to pollu-
tion control.
45
To illustrate the probable microeconomic effect of new import
duties complementing a production tax or legal regulation scheme,
Figure 1 is reproduced below as Figure 3, With the addition of a new
MV1 curve. It depicts the demand facing the domestic industry after
the import duty is imposed.46 Its precise position depends on the
effective rate of the duty; its slope depends on the elasticity of de-
mand for the product in general and the collective market power
of the firms in the domestic industry 4 7 The MVI curve has been
43. See, e.g., The Washington Post, Dec. 20, 1971, § A, at 1, col. 4.
44. See Proclamation No. 4074, 36 Fed. Reg. 15724 (1971).
45. It has been observed that pollution damage "is particularly severe in the basic
industries to which all industrial countries attach particular importance." GATT STUDY,
supra note S, at 13. There would be strong incentives to apply trade measures in behalf
of such industries. If such measures are adopted, there could be strong pressures from
other domestic industries for similar protection. Cf. id. at 14.
In the discussion of economic effects, we shall neglect the question of A's freedom
to impose new trade measures consistently with its GATT obligations. These obligations
are considered in part HI infra. In addition, we shall postpone until the end of this
section consideration of the possible effect of retaliation by A's trading partners.
46. The exposition is in terms of import duties rather than quotas. MV1, however,
could as well illustrate the effect of an import quota. The protective effect would be
essentially the same, though a quota-unlike the normal import duty--could prevent
an increase in domestic demand from being reflected in increased imports. See generally
R. BALDWIN, supra note 41, at 31-34; J. MEADE, supra note 7, at 173-75; G. VERarr,
TRADE AGREEMENTS FOR DEVELOPING CouNTRIEs 65-66 (1969).
47. The effect of an import duty on domestic production also depends on the
elasticity of supply in the domestic industry, reflected in the slopes of the MC curves
and their intersections with MV. See generally R. CooPER, supra note 86, at 239. The
appropriate magnitude of a duty designed to offset pollution-control costs would not
always be easy to determine. It would depend not only on the size of increased costs
directly imposed on the industry to be protected, but also on the increased cost to it
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given a steeper slope than MV, to reflect increased collective market
power of the domestic industry resulting from the new duty.
The new domestic output and price are indicated by the inter-
section between SMC 2 and MV1, the effective supply and demand
curves for the domestic industry. As the diagram is drawn, the
combination of tariff rate and demand-supply conditions has in-
creased domestic output to X3. On our assumption of relatively stable
aggregate demand maintained if necessary by monetary and fiscal
policy, imports would be reduced from X 2-X to X-X. Domestic out-
put, however, has not returned to its original level. Whether it would
in a given case depends on the factors that determine the position
and slope of MVI, as well as on the maintenance of over-all demand
in the face of price increases.
The introduction of new import duties could directly affect A's
pollution-control objective, though this would not be the case as the
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diagram is drawn. As shown, firms would still be making the neces-
sary pollution-control expenditures as domestic output rises from X2
to X8, since the social marginal cost of doing so (SMC2) is still below
the marginal tax or regulatory burden (SMC1) at that point.48 If
SMC2 rose more steeply and crossed SMC, to the left of the SMC1-
MV, intersection (i.e., if pollution-control expenses rose more rapidly
with output than shown), pollution control by the industry would
fall short of fall elimination of the marginal net cost to society in
excess of the industry's private cost. Instead, firms would be paying
the pollution tax (or incurring liability) over part of their output
range. This of course is more likely the greater the domestic output.
Thus, it is more likely with tariff protection than without, since the
tariff would normally increase domestic output.
Such an increase in domestic output would not necessarily frus-
trate A's pollution-control objectives, since the tax or liability pro-
ceeds, if equated to marginal net social cost, would reimburse society
for its loss. The proceeds could be used for centralized pollution con-
trol. In practice, however, the presumption in terms of optimal pol-
lution abatement must be against the adoption of measures that
could stimulate production beyond the point at which it becomes
uneconomical for firms to take fully effective abatement steps, even
though a payment is made in lieu of prevention. This is dictated in
part by the inevitable leakage to administrative, legal, and other
costs when the tax is paid or the liability incurred. It is also dictated
by the substantial risk that the pollution-control standard, repre-
sented in the diagram by the marginal damage line (SMC1), will be
set too low as a result of political pressures or inability to foresee
and/or estimate accurately the environmental costs involved. If the
standard is too low, the tax or liability will by definition provide
insufficient reimbursement for pollution damage.
The discussion to this point has assumed that any import duty
would be applied in conjunction with a tax on production in A. But
if A imposed a consumption tax on goods sold or used in A, wher-
ever produced, tariff protection would be unnecessary. In theory,
such a tax could effectively deal with pollution damage caused by
consumer products themselves. It would discourage consumers from
purchasing goods that impose heavy pollution costs, and encourage
producers at home and abroad to install pollution-control devices or
48. The industry, however, would be incurring greater marginal and total pol-
lution-control costs than in the absence of import duties.
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improve the product's composition if the consequent price increase
would be less than the amount of the tax.
The consumption tax, however, would not be appropriate to
reach pollution arising in the production process. It could not nor-
mally be tailored to the specific causes of the pollution in such a
manner as to induce changes in production methods. Moreover, it
would have no effect on the production of items for export (since
they are normally exempted from a consumption tax in the country
of export), except in so far as it is levied not on final goods but on
inputs into the domestic production process.
Similarly, the production tax has not been thought appropriate to
deal with pollution caused in the process of consumption.4 But this
case may not be entirely symmetrical with the consumption tax case.
It is true that if A is concerned with pollution only within its own
territory, there would be no point in imposing a tax on the pro-
duction of an item for export when the damage occurs only in its
consumption. To the extent, however, that the item is produced for
home consumption as well as for export, there may be some practical
advantage to a tax or regulation imposed directly on the producer,
who is in a position to correct whatever pollution-creating propen-
sities are built into the item.5 0 In addition, if production methods
as well as the final product contribute to pollution damage, there
may be an advantage in dealing with both problems at once in the
production stage.
This Article is not the place to argue these points. It is sufficient to
note that the production tax or regulation may not be wholly ir-
rational as a means of reducing consumption pollution, at least if
a significant proportion of the output is consumed at home. The
question for present purposes is whether new trade measures would
be likely as a result.
An export subsidy is the obvious candidate. A combination of
production tax and export rebate could simulate the effect of a con-
sumption tax. If the export rebate is limited to the burden imposed
on production with respect to harm caused by the end product, it
would not defeat A's parochial pollution-control objectives and would
49. Cf. Krauss, supra note 33, at 560-61.
50. See MAN'S IMPAcr ON Tm GLOBAL ENviOr'TENT, supra note 2, at 228; Gilbertson,
Present and Future Trends in Municipal Disposal of Solid Wastes, in W.H.O. PUBLIC
HEAT PAPERS No. 38, PROBLEMS IN CoiMneuNrrY WAsm MANAcEmENT 9, 19 (1969);
Kneese, Air Pollution-General Background and Some Economic Aspects, in Tnn
EcoNoMIcs OF AIR POLLUTION 23, 36 (H. Wolozin ed. 1966).
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help to preserve the price competitiveness of the exports.5 1 If the
rebate extended to pollution damage resulting from the production
process, however, it would frustrate A's pollution-control efforts;
export of the product would avoid the (tax) burden of pollution
control without also exporting the pollution. The result would be
the same with the combination of production regulation and export
subsidy, unless the sanction for failing to meet the regulated standard
is something more than liability refundable upon export.
The foregoing analysis has suggested that tariffs and limited ex-
port subsidies would be attractive to A as a means of protecting indi-
vidual industries or, with pollution control extending throughout
the economy, as possible corrective measures for balance-of-payments
difficulties-though with some risk to the attainment of optimal
pollution control. The discussion, however, has assumed the absence
of retaliation by A's trading partners. If they did retaliate with trade
measures of their own, they could diminish the exports of some of
A's industries or offset at least part of the balance-of-payments gain.
The degree to which A's trade measures would be neutralized de-
pends on the extent of the retaliation and upon A's monopolist or
monopsonist power in world markets, but the potential ability col-
lectively to affect A's trade in some degree is virtually certain.
Trade retaliation is, of course, the ultimate sanction under the
GATT for unilateral measures that violate GATT provisions or
that impair benefits otherwise accruing to members. 52 We will
consequently examine in part III the arguments under GATT for
and against the legitimacy of A's possible trade measures. Before
doing so, however, it is necessary to consider briefly the production
subsidy pollution-control approach.
C. Production Subsidies
At first glance it might appear that by subsidizing pollution con-
trol at the production stage, A could hold down commodity prices,
prevent loss of international competitiveness, and avoid a balance-of-
payments problem. Unfortunately, it is not so simple.
If production subsidies are widely employed, much depends on
51. The widespread use of nonuniform export subsidies and import charges, how-
ever, would probably result in resource misallocation. See, e.g., R. BALDviN, supra
note 41, at 21, 48-57. On the use of uniform export subsidies to complement import
duties for balance-of-payments adjustment, see id. at 19-22; Hearings on a Foreign
Economic Policy for the 1970's Before the Subcomm. on Foreign Economic Policy of the
Joint Economic Comm., 91st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 55 (1970) (statement of R. Cooper).
52. See GATT, art. XXIII. Cf. arts. VI; XIX, para. 3; XXVIII, para. 4.
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the method used to raise funds for the subsidies.53 If it is done pri-
marily by increasing taxes, the income redistribution effect (taxing
the general public and indirectly subsidizing a new pollution-control
equipment industry) could cause a downward shift in the demand
curve facing any given consumer goods industry. Because the taxes
would be spent for pollution-control equipment and operating costs,
there would not necessarily be a tax-engendered deflationary bias in
the economy. The balance-of-payments effect would be indetermi-
nate. Alternatively, if the subsidy funds are raised by increasing the
domestic money supply, there would be an upward shift in the de-
mand curve facing any industry producing normal goods, and infla-
tionary pressures would affect the balance of payments.
There is a middle ground for financing the subsidies, but it
too may fall short of solving the problems we have been discussing.
If a fiscal-monetary mix is used such that demand remains roughly
stable-a policy choice consistent with our basic macroeconomic
assumption-it is entirely possible that prices would rise and output
fall despite the subsidy. The reason may best be seen by reference
again to the marginal cost-marginal value approach to pollution con-
trol. In such an optimal system, production subsidies would be
offered for avoidance of excess net social cost through simple re-
ductions in output as well as for adoption of positive measures to
avoid damage. The subsidy would be limited to the excess net social
cost attributable to any unit of output if control measures were not
taken. The effect would be to increase the alternate opportunity
cost (out-of-pocket cost plus forgone benefits) of producing at the
former output, since firms would not only pay their out-of-pocket
costs but would also lose the opportunity to receive the subsidy. Thus,
firms would be induced to abate pollution damage, either by re-
ducing output or by taking (subsidized) steps to control pollution. 4
If they do the former, not only would output fall, but prices would
rise as well if the demand curve facing the domestic industry is less
than infinitely elastic (as shown in our diagrams).
If it is more profitable to take affirmative pollution-control steps,
output could still fall and prices rise if the marginal cost of avoiding
53. The use of production subsidies as a major tool for pollution control would
require heavier funding than the use of export subsidies to complement one of the
other pollution-control approaches. Hence the method of raising funds is relatively
more important to the determination of the economic consequences.
54. For a demonstration of this fact, using a model in which firms can control
pollution only by reducing production, see A. KNESmE & B. BowER, supra note 7, at
101-02.
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excess net social cost increases rapidly at relatively low outputs. The
maximum subsidy could be reached before output has returned to
its former level. Any further output would be at a marginal alternate
opportunity cost higher than that prevailing before pollution control.
In effect, the supply curve would shift upward, and would therefore
cut the (stationary) demand curve at a lower level of output and
higher price than before.
This is demonstrated in Figure 4, which again is an adaptation
FIGURE 4
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Domestic Output of Commodity and Total Quantity Demanded
of Figure 1. As output of the domestic industry expands along SMC2,
the production subsidy holds net private marginal cost to PMC until
expenditures for avoidance of excess net social cost from pollution
are no longer fully reimbursed (until SMC2 cuts SMCI). Further
production, with expenditures for avoidance of excess net social
cost, would follow PMC* until it intersects the demand curve, MV.
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PMC* is parallel to SMC2 and begins at point Z, which corresponds
to the point at which expenditures for avoidance of excess net social
cost are no longer fully reimbursed. Along PMC*, private marginal
cost consists of (a) the normal out-of-pocket marginal cost, plus (b)
the amount by which marginal expenditures for avoidance of excess
net social cost are greater than the maximum available subsidy.5u As
the diagram is drawn, the price would be slightly higher, domestic
output slightly lower, and imports slightly greater than before pol-
lution-control intensification.
Therefore, even if the subsidy funds are raised by a balanced fiscal
monetary policy, international competitiveness could suffer.50 The
adverse effects, however, would normally be less severe than in the
case of unilateral production taxes or regulatory measures and might
be avoided entirely if pollution abatement costs do not rise too rap-
idly with output.
There are other distinctions between the subsidy approach and
the tax and regulatory approaches. The effect on domestic income
distribution would differ from that of the other two approaches,
since different groups would bear the ultimate pollution-control
costs. The total resource cost is greater with production subsidies than
with production taxes or regulation unaccompanied by trade bar-
riers, because of the greater output to which pollution-control costs
attach.
57
Finally, as in the case of new import duties, there is the possibil-
ity of trade retaliation that could offset, at least in part, the price and
output advantages of production subsidies. This, of course, is part
of the broader question of legitimate trade measures in the existing
international legal order, to which we turn in part III below.
D. Summary
Part II has attempted to demonstrate not only what one would
intuitively expect-that effective, comprehensive pollution control
is likely to result in price increases-but also that these increases, in
an economy that is at least relatively open to international trade,
55. If these expenditures were not made after SMC 2 intersects SMC , marginal alter-
nate opportunity cost would rise immediately to SMC1 and output woui'd not expand be-
yond point Z. It would clearly be more profitable for firms in the industry to make
the expenditures even though they are not fully subsidized, and to expand output to Xa.
56. As we have seen, trade flows are quite sensitive even to relatively slight changes
in cost and price differentials. See text accompanying note 56 supra.
57. The caveat concerning production-stimulating policies, expressed in connection
with import duties in text following note 48 supra, applies here as well.
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and in the absence of comparable pollution control by most or all
major trading partners, are likely to result in reduced domestic out-
put and a drop in employment in the affected industries. In addition,
unilateral pollution control could contribute to balance-of-payments
difficulties, even with a wider band around new currency parities,
unless counterbalancing measures are adopted. The use of subsidies
would not be a complete answer. They would not ensure interna-
tional competitiveness, and would tend to boost domestic production
beyond the optimal pollution-control level.
Devaluation would be appropriate if balance-of-payments dif-
ficulties are expected to persist, but not if the problems of import-
competing and exporting industries do not rise to the level of a
payments imbalance for the nation, or if the payments imbalance
were expected to be transitory (which, of course, is not the same as
saying that it is inconsequential). Without effective international
pollution-control coordination, the temptation will be strong to erect
new import barriers. These could restore some of the lost domestic
output and employment, but at a cost in terms of resource mis-
allocation. Questions are raised about how such trade-related mea-
sures fit into the existing international legal order. These questions
are considered in part III.
III. POLLUTION CONTROL IN THE EXISTING WORLD TRADE ORDERING
SYSTEM
The existing legal order for world trade is built around the
GATT, which reflects postwar trade liberalization policies directed
toward the elimination of nontariff barriers to trade and the gradual
reduction of tariff barriers. 8 The goals of economic growth and "full
58. On the background to GATT, see G. CURzON, MuLTILATERAL COMMCAL
DIPLOMrACY, THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE AND iS IMnPACT ON
NATIONAL COMMERCIAL POLICIES AND TECHNIQUE 15-83 (1965); K. DAM, THE GATT;
LAw AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 10-16 (1970); J. JACKSON, WORMD
TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT 35-57 (1969). These three books together provide a
comprehensive picture of the world trade system under GATT. For narratives on the
rise and fall of the abortive Havana Charter for an International Trade Organization
(which would have included the substance of the GATT), see W. DmOLU, THE END
OF THE I.T.O. (Princeton Essays in Intl. Fin. No. 16, 1952); R. GARDNER, STERLING-
DOLLAR DIPLOmACY 348-80 (2d ed. 1969). On the substance of the Havana Charter, see
C. WILCOX, A CHARTER FOR WORLD TRADE (1949).
The General Agreement incorporates the commercial policy provisions of the
Havana Charter. Consequently the preparatory work relating to those Charter pro-
visions is relevant to the GATT. It stems primarily from the United Nations Conference
on Trade and Employment, held in Havana in 1947-1948 [hereinafter Havana Con-
ference]. On the use of preparatory work and other materials outside the instrument in
interpreting the General Agreement, see J. JACKSON, supra at 17-26. Cf. Vienna Conven-
tion on the Law of Treaties, art. 31, 63 Am. J. INTL. L. 875, 885 (1969) (not in force).
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use of the resources of the world" through freer trade appear in the
preamble.59 The body of the Agreement contains detailed provisions
designed to achieve these goals, but includes a number of important
exceptions that will be the focus of much of the following discussion.
In the absence of an international pollution-control regime deal-
ing with economic as well as ecological and biological considerations,
GATT provides the major external legal restraint on the freedom
of national decision-makers to effectuate domestic policies designed
to mitigate the economic effects of industrial pollution control.00
GATT provisions for consultations with other parties and with the
CONTRACTING PARTIES61 seek to ensure that national officials
concerned with trade matters take into account the interests of trading
partners as reflected in GATT substantive rules.02 Negotiations sub-
ject to the sanctions of international disapprobation and possible
retaliation have provided a reasonably effective means of restraining
trade-reducing conduct inconsistent with GATT, so long as perceived
vital national interests, which cannot be served within the letter of
the General Agreement, are not at stake.63 It will therefore be im-
portant to ask, first, whether the measures we have examined in part
II are consistent with GATT substantive rules, and then whether
those rules are adequate for resolution of the conflict between eco-
nomic and environmental interests. 4
59. For a summary of the economic benefits to be derived from trade liberalization,
see B. BALASSA, TRADE LBERALIZATION AmONG INDUSTRIAL COUNTRm.s 69-124 (1967). The
reduction of individual tariffs raises questions under the economic theory of the second
best. See text accompanying notes 9-11 supra. It is the philosophy of GATT, however,
and is generally accepted as a practical matter, that a continuing process of nondis-
criminatory trade liberalization is beneficial, at least among countries similar in
economic structures and in stages of development. See, e.g., G. & V. Curzon, Options
After the Kennedy Round, in NEW TRADE STRATEGY FOR THE Woum ECONOMY 19, 23
(H. Johnson ed. 1969).
60. Not all trading nations are parties to GATT. See note 16 supra. However, GATT
members and nations applying GATT de facto account for more than four fifths of
world trade. See GATT Secretariat, supra note 16, at 791.
61. In accordance with GATT practice, references to "CONTRACTING PARTIES"
are to the parties acting collectively in their institutional capacity. References to "con-
tracting parties" are to the parties qua parties, but not in an institutional sense. See
GATT, art. XXV, para. 1.
62. Consultation provisions appear throughout the General Agreement. See, e.g.,
GATT, arts. 11, para. 5; XII, par. 4; XIII, para. 4; XVI, para. 1; XVIII, para. 12;
XIX, para. 2; XXII; XXIII; XXXVII, paras. 2 & 5.
63. For discussion of instances in whichl substantive provisions in the General Agree-
ment appear to have been honored largely in the breach, see K. Dar, supra note 58,
at 165-66 (quantitative import restrictions); G. Vmaarr, supra note 46, at 19-23 (prefer-
ential trade agreements entered into by developing countries). See generally J. JcAsoN,
supra note 58, at 756-63.
64. Much of the discussion will focus on GATT as a set of substantive rules rather
[Vol. 70:859
April 1972] Pollution Control in Industrial Countries 887
A. GA TT Problems Under the Tax or Legal Regulation Approach
The issues surrounding either the tax or the legal regulation ap-
proach center on articles I through III. These articles are the heart
of the GATT ordering system for trade among industrialized coun-
tries.
Article I, paragraph 1, the unconditional most-favored-nation
clause, provides:
With respect to customs dudes and charges of any kind imposed
on or in connection with importation or exportation or imposed on
the international transfer of payments for imports or exports, and
with respect to the method of levying such dudes and charges, and
with respect to all rules and formalities in connection with importa-
tion and exportation, and with respect to all matters referred to in
paragraphs 2 and 4 of Article III, any advantage, favour, privilege
or immunity granted by any contracting party to any product origi-
nating in or destined for any other country shall be accorded im-
mediately and unconditionally to the like product originating in or
destined for the territories of all other contracting parties.
Once a rate of import duty has been "bound" by agreement
reached within the GATT system of negotiations, 5 article II, para-
graph l(b) requires that the bound rate be observed with respect to
all GATT parties, and that the covered products "be exempt from all
other duties or charges of any kind imposed on or in connection with
importation in excess of those imposed on the date of this Agree-
ment or those directly and mandatorily required to be imposed there-
after by legislation in force in the importing territory on that date."
However, article II, paragraph 2(a) exempts from this requirement
"a charge equivalent to an internal tax imposed consistently with
than as an institution. It is recognized that in many respects GATT as an institution is
more significant than GATT as a quasi-legislative document. To the extent, however,
that the rules reflect shared expectations about how the parties to GATT will conduct
themselves, they supply the ordering system without which the institution would be
ineffective. On GATT as an institution, see K. DAar, supra note 58, at 335-75; J.
JAcrsoN, supra note 58, at 119-89. On the importance of substantive rules in the GATT
context, see Hudec, GATT or GABB? The Future Design of the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade, 80 YALE L.J. 1299 (1971).
The discussion will no longer rely on the assumption, useful to the demonstration
of economic effects in part II, that pollution-control measures are applied optimally
by reference to marginal social costs and values. If they were applied by some non-
marginal rule of thumb, the GATT issues would not be materially different.
65. On tariff bindings under GATT, see K. DAM, supra note 58, at 30-31. In general,
a binding is an undertaking not to increase a duty above a stated rate. Tariff bindings
stabilize trading relationships and permit traders to plan ahead with some degree of
certainty. See G. CuRzoN, supra note 58, at 108. GATT does contain a provision ex-
pressly permitting negotiated modification of bound duties. See art. XXVIII, discussed
in text accompanying note 127 infra.
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the provisions of paragraph 2 of Article III in respect of the like
domestic product or in respect of an article from which the imported
product has been manufactured or produced in whole or in part."
Article III, paragraph 2 applies to unbound as well as bound
items.68 It provides in part that "[t]he products of the territory of
any contracting party imported into the territory of any other con-
tracting party shall not be subject, directly or indirectly, to internal
taxes or other internal charges of any kind in excess of those applied,
directly or indirectly, to like domestic products." 67 Article III, para-
graph 4, also applicable to unbound as well as bound items, provides
that imports are to be treated as favorably as like domestic products
"in respect of all laws, regulations and requirements affecting their
internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution
or use."
The tax and legal regulation approaches to pollution control
raise similar GATT issues. As will appear from the discussion to
follow, there seems to be no instance in which protective measures
designed to complement the legal regulation approach would be
66. See Working Party Report, Brazilian Internal Taxes, II GATT, BISD 181, 182
(1952). All reports of GATT Working Parties, Panels, and Groups of Experts cited
herein have been adopted by the CONTRACTING PARTIES or by the Council. On
the procedure involved, see J. JAcKSoN, supra note 58, at 160-62, 175-76. On the role
of the Council, see id. at 154-57.
67. The second sentence of article III, paragraph 2 adds: "Moreover, no contracting
party shall otherwise apply internal taxes or other internal charges to imported or
domestic products in a manner contrary to the principles set forth in paragraph ."
Paragraph I requires parties to "recognize" that internal charges, inter alia, "should
not be applied to imported or domestic products so as to afford protection to domestic
production."
The combined effect of the two sentences of article III appears to be that so long
as an import competes only with a "like" domestic product, it receives the sole benefit
of the first sentence (quoted in the text above), in the form of a conclusive presumption
of protective effect if a higher charge is applied to the import than to the domestic
product. If the import does not compete with a "like" domestic product but does
compete with a substitute product, the second sentence applies and is restricted to
the case in which the charge can be shown to afford protection to domestic producers.
If the import competes with "like" and substitute products, both sentences apply. See
GATT, ad. art. III, para. 2; K. DAm, supra note 58, at 118-21; EPORr OF ComrIrrEr.
ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INvESrMENT, INTERNATIONAL LAw ASSN. 52d REPORT 369,
392-93 (1966). Cf. Brazilian Internal Taxes, supra note 66, at 184; id., 2d Supp.
BISD 25, 26 (1954); id., 4th Supp. BISD 21, 22 (1956); GATT ANALYrICAL INDox 22
(3d rev. 1970) [hereinafter ANALYTicAL INDEx], quoting from Reports of the Havana
Conference.
Whether the domestic item is a "like" product is not always easy to ascertain.
GATT investigations have stressed the inclusion or noninclusion of the imported and
domestic products in the same item of the tariff schedules of the respondent state, at
least if supported by similar treatment in tariff schedules of other countries. See Work-
ing Party Report, The Australian Subsidy on Ammonium Sulphate, II BISD 188, 191
(1952); Panel Report, Treatment by Germany of Imports of Sardines, Ist Supp. BISD
53, 57-58 (1953). Cf. G. CURZON, supra note 58, at 62-63; J. JACKsON, supra note 58,
at 263-64.
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permissible under GATT when similar measures complementing
the appropriate tax approach would not be. Most of the relevant
practice under GATT has concerned taxes of various sorts. Conse-
quently it is convenient to discuss the issues primarily in terms of
the tax approach and point out any distinctions applicable to legal
regulation. It is useful to begin with the consumption tax, since it
fits most comfortably into the GATT framework and thus can serve
as a vehicle for subsequent normative evaluation of measures as-
sociated with production taxes and legal regulation.
1. The Consumption Tax or Equivalent Regulation
If country A taxes the consumption (sale, use, or disposal) of a
product that itself causes pollution damage, regardless of the prod-
uct's origin, and the tax is uniformly applied without exemption or
rebate, there would be no inconsistency with articles I through 111.68
In particular, articles II and paragraph 2 of article III are tailored
to turnover and use taxes applied to final products, and impose no
obstacle to them so long as they are uniformly applied.69 The only
significant question concerning bound items would arise if the con-
68. This is so whether the duty on the product has been bound or not, by virtue of
the exemption in article II, paragraph 2(a).
69. It might be contended, however, that these articles permit an equivalent charge
only when the domestic tax is imposed for general revenue purposes. This could be
inferred from an inconclusive statement by a GAIT Panel for Conciliation, in French
Assistance to Exports of Wheat and Wheat Flour, 7th Supp. BISD 46, 51 (1959). The
Panel was considering an export exemption from a tax imposed on wheat marketed
domestically, the proceeds of which were used to finance agricultural family allowances.
It said that it was "questionable whether such an exemption was within the ambit of
the preamble to the interpretative notes to Article XVI," which permits the exemption
of an exported product from taxes borne by the like product destined for domestic
consumption. If a tax is not eligible for export rebate, it could not be applied to
imports under article Ill. See K. DAw, supra note 58, at 211. The only plausible
explanation of the GATT Panel's doubt would be that the tax was used for a
specialized purpose connected with production of the taxed article. Such a rationale
could be stretched to the pollution tax case, but the Panel's statement is too incon-
clusive in its own context to provide a sound basis for doing so.
Cf. In re Import Duties on Gingerbread, 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 199, 217 (1963), in
which the Court of Justice of the European Communities appears to have doubted
whether a charge imposed for other than fiscal purposes could be applied to imports
under EEC Treaty article 95, first sentence-the counterpart of GATT article III,
paragraph 2, first sentence. But see Sociaal Fonds voor de Diamantarbeiders v. S.A.
Ch. Brachfield & Sons, 8 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 335, 350-51 (1969), in which the Court
looked to the nature of a charge rather than to its purpose in determining whether
it had an effect equivalent to a customs duty for purposes of the EEC Treaty; In re
Aids to the Textile Industry, 9 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 351, 363 (1970), in which the Court
did not question the respondent state's argument that a tax to raise revenue for aid
to the textile industry, applied to sales of domestic and imported textiles, was con-
sistent with article 95 (though the Court upheld the EEC Commission's determination
that the scheme contravened article 92, concerning measures incompatible with the
Common Market).
Michigan Law Review
sumption tax were a disguised import duty. It would not be con-
sidered such if it were applied equally to domestic products and to
imports.70
As we have seen, however, if consumption taxes are to be effective
inducements to pollution-damage avoidance, they would have to
provide exemptions whenever the excess social cost imposed by the
taxed commodity has been eliminated.71 Measures to that end could be
expected to be taken primarily at the production stage. Thus, if a
product is produced in two or more exporting countries, imports
from one country might be taxed (because the producer has not taken
steps to eliminate excess social cost from consumption) while those
from another are not. Similarly, the tax might exempt some home-
produced goods, but not damage-inflicting "like" imports. The ques-
tion in these cases is whether most-favored-nation treatment, or the
equality-of-internal-charge requirement of article III, paragraph 2,
requires exemption for the environmentally offensive imports.
Several exceptions to most-favored-nation treatment are written
into the General Agreement, 72 and there have been derogations
from it with and without benefit of formal GATT waiver.78 Never-
theless, much of GATT is built around the most-favored-nation
principle,74 and there is no precedent for deviating from it on pol-
lution-control grounds. It retains enough vitality in relations among
industrially developed nations to affect the decisions made by na-
tional officials seeking to implement any pollution-control approach.
70. See ANALYncAL INDnx, supra note 67, at 23, quoting from Reports of the
Havana Conference. See also Panel Report, Belgian Family Allowances, 1st Supp.
BISD 59, 60 (1953). The tax would not be considered an import duty even if it were
collected in the customs process. See GATT, ad art. I.
We shall assume throughout that all substantive pollution-control measures are
applied in good faith for pollution-control objectives, rather than as disguised trade
barriers. As to the latter problem, see CEQ 1971 REPORT, supra note 1, at 132,
71. See text accompanying notes 19-21 and preceding note 49 supra.
72. See generally GATT Secretariat, supra note 16. The relevant exceptions are
discussed in text accompanying notes 80-84 infra and in pt. I. A. 2. b. infra.
73. See id. at 800; G. Vzawrr, supra note 46, at 19-23. The pertinent GATT waiver
provision is in article XXV, paragraph 5. It has recently been argued that the most-
favored-nation clause is not applicable to preferential trade agreements between
developed and developing countries. See Espiell, The Most-Favoured-Nation Clause:
Its Present Significance in GATT, 5 J. WoRm TRADE L. 29 (1971); Verbit, Preferences
and the Public Law of International Trade: The End of Most-Favoured-Nation Treat-
ment?, HAGUE ACADEmY COLLoQUiUm 1968, at 19, 46-53. See generally G. PATrERsoN,
DISCRIMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL TADiE: Tim POLICY IssUEs 1945-1965 (1966).
74. For an expression of its importance to GATT, see T. FLORY, LE GA.T.T.:
DRorr INTERNATIONAL ETr COM ERCE MONDIAL 13-14 (1968). On the economic rationale
of the most-favored-nation principle, see J. VINER, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 97-99
(1951). Cf. G. & V. Curzon, supra note 59, at 54-55.
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Taken literally, article I would require consumption tax exemp-
tion for all imports of like products when the exemption is granted
to imports from any external source.7 5 The tax would be a "matter"
referred to in paragraph 2 of article III (and thus covered by article
I); the obligation is to accord all parties any advantage granted to
the like product originating in any other country. Any argument to
the effect that pollution-engendering and pollution-free imports are
not "like products" for most-favored-nation purposes is unpersuasive
unless, perhaps, a number of countries adopt such a distinction for
tariff classification purposes.
76
At least in the absence of established GATT practice to the con-
trary in a particular field (such as trade arrangements involving
developing countries), literal interpretation of this provision is sug-
gested by the structure of the General Agreement, with the broadly
worded most-favored-nation clause followed at various places in the
Agreement by express exceptions. It is suggested also by the report
of a GATT Panel on Complaints in the Belgian Family Allowances
case.77 Belgium applied a levy on foreign goods purchased by Belgian
public bodies whenever the exporting state did not require its pro-
ducers to pay family allowance contributions for their employees
roughly comparable to those payable by Belgian producers under
Belgian law. Norway and Denmark had no such requirement. They
objected on the ground, inter alia, that they were nevertheless en-
titled to exemption from the levy under article I of GATT, since
suppliers in states with family allowance contribution requirements
comparable to Belgium's had been duly exempted. The Panel con-
cluded that the Belgian system was inconsistent with article I, which
involved an unconditional "undertaking to extend an exemption of
an internal charge"78 to the nonconforming states. The Panel found
no applicable exception in the General Agreement. 9
The Belgian Family Allowances case strongly suggests that the
exemption of a consumption pollution tax with respect to imports
75. On the broad coverage of article I, see G. VERarr, supra note 46, at 37; Ruling
by the Chairman, II BISD 12 (1952).
76. See note 67 supra. But see J. JACKSON, supra note 58, at 501-02, describing an
opinion of the Chairman of a GATT committee that had the effect of differentiating
for most-favored-nation purposes between bales of jute according to the form in which
they were shipped.
77. 1st Supp. BISD 59 (1953).
78. Id. at 60.
79. The result reached on the merits was inconclusive because of the effect of the
Protocol of Provisional Application of GATT. See GATT, ad art. I; Jackson, The
Puzzle of GATT, 1 J. WoRmD TRADE L. 131, 137-40 (1967).
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from some external sources would engage the GATT most-favored-
nation clause, unless there is an express exception available for pol-
lution taxes that was not available for family allowance contributions.
The exceptions having the clearest relevance to the pollution tax
on consumption appear in article XX,8o which provides in part:
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied
in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or un-
justifiable discrimination between countries where the same con-
ditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade,
nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption
or enforcement by any contracting party of measures:
(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health;
(g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources
if such measures are made effective in conjunction with
restrictions on domestic production or consumption;
The "health protection! exception to most-favored-nation treat-
ment is generally recognized to be necessary, but susceptible to
abuse."' Article XX reflects the fear of abuse, although its attempt
to deal with the situation is hardly a model of clarity. The standards
are not readily apparent by which to judge whether a discrimination
between countries in which the same conditions prevail is or is not
"justifiable," nor is the meaning of "disguised restriction on inter-
national trade" perfectly clear.82 Nevertheless, if the taxing country
is able to demonstrate a danger to human, animal, or plant health
from pollution arising in the consumption of the taxed products, and
if it administers the tax evenhandedly among its own products and
all foreign products from whatever source, there would seem to be
strong grounds for permissibility under article XX(b).
It might still be asked whether the consumption tax approach,
with its exemptions for pollution-damage avoidance, is "necessary"
80. Other GATT exceptions (such as those in article XXI on national security)
might also be relevant, depending on the facts of the specific case. In general, however,
they have greater relevance to taxes on production than on consumption.
81. See Ustor, Second Report [to the International Law Commn.] on the Most-
Favoured-Nation Clause, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/228/Add.1, at 41 (1970); GATT Secretariat,
supra note 16, at 797; ANALYTICAL. INDEX, supra note 67, at 116, quoting from Reports
of the Havana Conference. On the "health protection" exception in the pollution-
control context, see Doud, Developing International Environmental Regulation, in
PRIVATE INvETORS ABROAD--PROBLMS AND SOLUTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS IN
1971, at 247, 260-61 (Southwestern Legal Foundation 1971).
82. Cf. K. DAM, supra note 58, at 192-95; J. JACKSON, supra note 58, at 749.
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to protect health, since other means of protection might be used. An
adequate answer is that if some measures are necessary in order to
deal with the matter, there is no inconsistency with the "necessary"
requirement of article XX unless it could be shown that the measures
adopted are clearly unsuited to the health protection objective. This
does no violence either to the over-all goals of GATT or to the most-
favored-nation principle. Any other view would unduly limit the
discretion of GATT members to protect domestic health by means
that seem most appropriate to them, and would render article XX(b)
too restrictive to have any influence over the actual conduct of na-
tional decision-makers.
The applicability of article XX(g), concerning conservation of
natural resources, is less clear. It was intended primarily to authorize
export controls on products drawn from natural resources that are
in danger of being exhausted from overexploitation.8 3 It is never-
theless arguable that the consumption tax, which attempts to con-
serve natural resources "exhaustible" in the sense that they may not
survive the pollution inflicted on them (and which involves a re-
striction on domestic consumption), would fall within the provision.
In the light of the clearer applicability of article XX(b), however,
such an attempt to stretch article XX(g) is unnecessary.84
As with article I, principles of nondiscrimination support article
III, paragraph 2, concerning equality of tax treatment between
domestic and imported products. A drafting subcommittee at the
Havana Conference noted that article III, paragraph 8(b), dealing
with the payment of subsidies to domestic producers, "was redrafted
in order to make it dear that nothing in Article [III] could be con-
strued to sanction the exemption of domestic products from internal
taxes imposed on like imported products or the remission of such
taxes."8 5 This suggests that the exemption from consumption tax
for avoidance of pollution damage by domestic products could run
afoul of article III, paragraph 2 in the absence of an applicable ex-
83. See G. VmBrr, supra note 46, at 221-22.
84. It would also be possible to seek a waiver from the most-favored-nation obliga-
tion under article XXV, paragraph 5. A number of such waivers have been given in
other contexts. See J. JACKSON, supra note 58, at 549-52; GATT Secretariat, supra note
16, at 800. As indicated in the text, such a waiver would not be needed so long as
the consumption tax is tailored to its purpose and is administered evenhandedly.
85. ANALYrCAL INDEx, supra note 67, at 28, quoting from Reports of the Havana
Conference. Cf. Belgian Family Allowances, 1st Supp. BISD 59 (1958), which dealt
with articles III, paragraph 2 as well as the most-favored-nation clause. The Panel's
treatment of article MI, paragraph 2, however, was inconclusive. Moreover, the tax
in that case was designed to apply only to imports.
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ception elsewhere in the General Agreement. The purpose of article
III, paragraph 2, however, is to prevent disguised protection for
domestic products. When the domestic tax exemption is not simply
in favor of the domestic product at the expense of the like imported
product-i.e., is available to products from any source-a finding of
incompatibility with article III, paragraph 2 would not be required
by the remarks of the drafting subcommittee or by the language of
article III, paragraph 2, interpreted in light of its purpose.s0 How-
ever, it is not necessary to dwell on this point, since the health ex-
ception of article XX(b) is also applicable to article III, paragraph 2.
As indicated above, this exception would fit the consumption tax
case. It is broad enough to encompass bound as well as unbound items.
If consumption is subjected to direct statutory or administrative
regulation rather than a tax, the result would be the same. Article III,
paragraph 4 requires treatment of imports comparable to that re-
quired by article III, paragraph 2.87 The most-favored-nation provi-
sion of article I, paragraph 1 refers to matters in article III, para-
graph 4, as well as those in article III, paragraph 2. The health
exception is again available, so long as the regulatory scheme is not
devised or administered in such a way as to constitute a nontariff
trade barrier-a risk greater (because of the administrative discre-
tion involved) than in the case of a consumption tax. Again, it would
not matter for purposes of the exception whether the items had been
bound under article II.
A further problem arises if the consumption tax or regulation
is applied not to the final product, but to intermediate products that
go into it, or to capital equipment used in its manufacture. The
problem does not stem directly from application of the consumption
tax or regulation to imports of the intermediate products or capital
equipment, but from any attempt country A might make to neutral-
ize the cost disadvantage to its producers by imposing a charge di-
86. Cf. ANAMLcrAL INDEX, supra note 67, at 20, quoting from Reports of the
Havana Conference, to the effect that "[t]he new form of the Article makes dearer
than did the Geneva text the intention that internal taxes on goods should not be
used as a means of protection;" J. JAcKsoN, supra note 58, at 743. The antiprotective
purpose applies to both sentences of article III, paragraph 2, even though only the
second sentence refers (indirectly) to the protection of domestic production. See note
67 supra. For discussion of the type of case in which article III has been applied, see
J. JACKSON, supra at 284.
A similarly teleological argument might be made concerning the most-favored-nation
clause. The language of article I, however, seems less amenable to the argument than
does that of article III. Moreover, the risk of opening a new door to trade discrimina-
tion outside the pollution-control context is greater because of the wider range of
potentially discriminatory practices covered by article I. See text following note 95
infra.
87. See text following note 67 supra.
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rectly on the import of competing finished products. The issues are
essentially the same as those raised by the production tax or regula-
tion supplemented by a compensating charge on imports, and will
be considered in that context below.
2. The Production Tax or Equivalent Regulation
a. Articles I through 111. As we have seen, it would be appro-
priate for A to deal with pollution arising in the production process
(for example, from waste disposal) through a production tax or com-
parable regulation.88 This may also be a convenient means of attack-
ing some consumption pollution, if a substantial portion of domestic
production is sold in the home market.89 The question is whether
a charge on imports designed to offset the domestic producers' cost
disadvantage could be imposed consistently with A's GATT obliga-
tions stemming from articles I through 111.90
For ease of tariff administration, the charge would probably be
applied equally to imports from all sources, even though the price
of the imports might reflect differing (foreign) pollution-control
costs. If A did attempt to serve equity by providing an exemption
for imports already burdened by significant pollution-control costs
(or by charging only unburdened imports), it would be open to a
most-favored-nation challenge from suppliers who have not been sub-
jected to strong pollution control. Article I is squarely applicable,
unless it could successfully be argued that "discrimination" by ref-
erence to pollution-control costs, rather than by country, removes
the case.91
A roughly analogous type of import charge has been brought to
88. See pt. II. A. supra.
89. See text accompanying notes 49-50 supra.
90. The import-reducing effect of such a charge is shown in Figure 3 supra.
Diffculties would arise in determining the appropriate offsetting amount of the
charge. See note 47 supra.
91. There would be even less room here than in the consumption tax case for
the argument that the exempted and dutied imports are not "like products." The
difference here lies not in the products but in the production methods. See GATT
STuDY, supra note 3, at 17-18. Cf. J. JAcKsoN, supra note 58, at 259; text accompanying
note 76 supra.
It has been suggested that the concept of subsidy might be stretched to include
failure of governments to impose effective pollution controls on production processes.
Importing nations might then be able to impose countervailing duties without violating
the most-favored-nation obligation. See Doud, supra note 81, at 262-65. The argument
is rather tenuous, in view of the risks to a liberal trade regime of permitting nations
to treat as subsidies the failure of foreign governments to impose cost-increasing
measures comparable to those imposed (perhaps for social or economic as well as
environmental reasons) domestically. See text accompanying notes 95 & 112 infra. On
countervailing duties, see text accompanying notes 164-66 infra.
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the attention of the CONTRACTING PARTIES without evoking
any definitive response based on article I. This is the variable import
duty designed to raise the price of imported goods (from whatever
source) to an artificially maintained domestic price.0 2 A former
GATT Executive Secretary viewed the article I issue as "a serious
question which had not been resolVed," 93 and a GATT Panel ducked
the issue when it was presented in a complaint by a member state.0 4
This suggests an argument to the effect that duties or charges that
put all foreign competitors on the same domestic price footing with
each other (and with domestic producers) may accord equal "advan-
tages" to like products originating in all contracting parties, even
though the amount of the duty is proportionately greater for low-
cost producers. 5
In the pollution-control context, this argument has some policy
grounds supporting it. If a country such as A is likely to impose new
import charges (and may do so under GATT), and if A has a signifi-
cant market for industrial imports, there is a disincentive to indus-
trial pollution control in its supplier countries unless it may (and
does) grant an exemption for imports from pollution-controlling
countries. Decision-makers in supplier countries will think twice
about imposing effective pollution control on their export sectors
if it means the worst of two economic worlds: new costs not neces-
sarily incurred by competing suppliers, in addition to the new im-
port charges.
Nevertheless, the policy argument should not be carried too far.
It could open the door to subtle trade discrimination beyond the
pollution-control context, thus introducing new uncertainties and
possibilities of retaliation into trade relationships. Administration
of the import charge would not be subject to built-in constraints
92. For discussion of the European Economic Community's variable levy on agri-
cultural products, see G. PATrEasoN, supra note 73, at 202-04, 212-16.
93. See GATT Secretariat, supra note 16, at 792-93. See also ANALYrICAL INDEX,
supra note 67, at 6.
94. Panel Report, Uruguayan Recourse to Article XXIII, llth Supp. BISD 95, 100
(1963).
95. Variable levies have been used primarily as a substitute for quantitative im-
port restrictions on farm products. See G. PATrERSON, supra note 73, at 202. Agri-
cultural import restrictions are the benefidaries of special GATT exceptions. See art.
XI, para. 2(c). Quantitative restrictions are not covered by the article I most-favored-
nation clause, though elsewhere in the General Agreement they are qualified by a
rule of nondiscrimination. See art. XIII. Cf. art. XIV. It has been argued within
GATT that a variable levy should be treated as if it were a quantitative restrictioni.
See ANALYTICAL ItNEX, supra note 67, at 6. This may explain the GATT equivocation
over applicability of article I, but the more plausible argument is that outlined in
the text above.
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comparable to those surrounding the pollution tax or regulation
applied to consumption of final products, where the tax or regula-
tion is applied to domestic as well as imported products and is itself
designed to attain domestic health objectives. The substance of the
most-favored-nation clause is not only the stability it imparts to trade
relationships, but also its effect of preserving the comparative ad-
vantage enjoyed by the lowest-cost foreign producers, without regard
to value judgments in the importing state about the desirability of
policies that permit the low costs. On balance, the purposes of the
most-favored-nation clause seem best served by requiring any import
surcharge to be applied equally to all foreign suppliers, so that an
exemption for one would accrue to all. The conflict with desirable
transnational pollution-control policy, which would permit or re-
quire selective exemptions if new charges are to be levied, illustrates
one of the difficulties of achieving economic and environmental
goals simultaneously under a system lacking machinery for effective
pollution-control coordination.
Problems in adapting GATT rules to the pollution-control con-
text are again apparent when one considers the application of arti-
cles II and III. There is nothing in either article to restrict the im-
position of a new charge on unbound items, if the charge is in the
nature of an import duty.96 On the other hand, the article III re-
strictions would apply if the charge is in the form of an internal
taxY7 If it is imposed in conjunction with a domestic production
tax, or consumption tax on intermediate goods, there would be a
strong argument that it should be treated as an internal tax within
the meaning of article III, paragraph 2. The import charge would
be assimilated to the tax it is intended to offset 9s -a result that is
not precluded by the language of article III, paragraph 2 and that
furthers its purpose by bringing the trade-related measure affecting
unbound items within the GATT system of constraints. This means
that the charge could be applied only if the domestic tax is eligible
96. Article II applies only to bound items. Article I applies only to internal taxes
and regulations. On the scope of article III, see ANALYTICAL INDEX, supra note 67, at
21, quoting from Reports of the Havana Conference.
97. On the anomaly of exempting import duties on unbound items from the
strictures of article I, see K. DAm, supra note 58, at 116; J. JACKSON, supra note 58,
at 286.
98. This is the position taken by the Court of Justice of the European Com-
munities under the equivalent provisions of the EEC Treaty. See Alfons Lutticke GmbH
v. Hauptzollamt de Sarrelouis, Case 57/65, at 293, 303 (Eur. Ct. J., June 16, 1966). Cf.
ANALYTiCAL INDEX, supra note 67, at 23, quoting from Reports of the Havana Con-
ference.
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for offset under article III, paragraph 2; moreover, the charge could
not exceed the amount applied, directly or indirectly, to the like
domestic product. These points will be explored below in the dis-
cussion concerning bound imports.
If the import charge on unbound items is imposed in conjunction
with a domestic pollution-control legal regulation (nontax) arrange-
ment, articles II and III do not provide a coherent ordering scheme.
It could be argued that the charge should still be considered internal,
since it obviously does not change its nature simply because a dif-
ferent domestic pollution-control approach (having the same effect
as the tax approach) is adopted. That would be difficult to reconcile,
however, with the language of article III, paragraph 2, which seems
to fit only the domestic tax case.99 Nor does the situation fit within
article III, paragraph 4, which refers to domestic laws and regula-
tions but does not deal with charges on imports. The result is anom-
alous: if the charge is considered an internal tax it would be pro-
hibited on its face by article III, paragraph 2, although the same
charge would be permitted (subject to constraints) if there were a
domestic pollution tax; if it is an import duty on unbound items,
it would escape the reach of articles II and III altogether and would
thus be subject to no formal constraint.
In the case of bound imports, articles II and III again are more
clearly adaptable to the pollution tax than to legal regulation of
pollution. For bound items, the exception in article II, paragraph 2(a)
for "a charge equivalent to an internal tax imposed consistently with
the provisions of... Article III" is limited to charges equivalent to
domestic taxes that, in the terminology of article III, paragraph 2,
are "applied, directly or indirectly, to like domestic products."' 00 It
is generally said that only indirect taxes are thus eligible for offset,
and that direct taxes are not. But by long-standing definition, direct
taxes are simply those levied on the persons who are expected to bear
their ultimate burden; indirect taxes are those which are expected
to be passed to someone other than the taxpayer, i.e., to the consumer
in the usual commercial situation.' 0 ' In effect, GATT practice has
supplied conclusive presumptions along these lines with regard to
99. See also ANALYTcAL INDmx, supra note 67, at 28.
100. This language applies also to charges on unbound items, if the charges are
treated as internal taxes. Consequently the discussion below applies equally to that
situation.
101. See J. S. MILL, PRINCIPI.S OF PoLmcAL ECONosnZ bk. 5, ch. 3, § 1, at 823 (Long-
mans, Green & Co. ed. 1926); Rolph, Taxation: General, in 15 INTL. ENcYCLOPEDIA o
THE SociAL ScIENcEs 521, 522 (1968).
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some taxes: turnover taxes are presumed to be shifted to the con-
sumer (and thus may be adjusted at the border), while income taxes
are presumed not to be (and thus may not be adjusted).
102
As to taxes for which GATT practice is not conclusive--such as
pollution-control taxes on production-the issue should be decided
not by asking on a priori grounds whether the tax is direct or indi-
rect, but by asking whether a material portion of it is paid by the
consumer of the domestic product. This is the least strained meaning
to be given to the language in article III, paragraph 2 and to com-
parable language in article VI, paragraph 4 and ad article XVI
("taxes borne by the like product").10 3 It is not always clear whether
a given tax is passed along.1°4 Probably relatively few are passed along
in toto, in the absence of perfectly inelastic demand. But if the tax
is tied to production methods or units of output, it is reasonably
certain that it will be borne by consumers to the extent that demand
conditions permit. The discussion in part II showed that the impo-
sition of a marginal production tax on a per-unit-of-output basis
would materially affect the price charged to domestic consumers, un-
less there is infinite elasticity of demand. Such a per-unit tax is not
far removed from a turnover tax. Leaving aside the question of pro-
duction tax rebates, it should be eligible for offset by an appropriate
import charge, even with regard to bound items. 0 5 The result should
102. For discussion of the GATT treatment of these taxes, see, e.g., R. BALDWIN,
supra note 41, at 84-89, 108-09; K. DAar, supra note 58, at 124; Han & Shaw, Value-
Added Taxation: The Economic Consequences, 4 J. WoRa TRADE L. 548, 557 (1970).
103. Articles VI, paragraph 4 and XVI deal with export rebates. Taxes eligible for
export rebate could also be offset by an import charge under articles 11 and III. See
K. DAm, supra note 58, at 211.
The GATT preparatory work contains the statement that "[n]either income taxes
nor import duties fall within the scope of Article [iI] which is concerned solely with
internal taxes on goods." ANALYTICAL INEx, sUpra note 67, at 21, quoting from Re-
ports of the Havana Conference. In view of the language used in the Agreement and
the nature of the direct-indirect tax dichotomy, it would not be reasonable to construe
this statement to mean that only taxes having their formal incidence on the goods
themselves could be offset by an equivalent import charge.
104. For example, there is considerable controversy over the proposition that income
taxes are wholly absorbed by the taxpayer. The extensive literature includes: R.
MUSGRAVE & M. KRZYANIAK, THE SHIFrING Or THE CORPORATION INCOME TAX (1963);
Cragg, Harberger & Mieszowski, Empirical Evidence on the Incidence of the Corpora-
tion Income Tax, 75 J. POL. ECON. 811 (1967); Krzyzaniak & Musgrave, Corporation
Tax Shifting: A Response, 78 id. 768 (1970); Cragg, Harberger & Mieszowski, Corpora-
tion Tax Shifting: Rejoinder, 78 id. 774 (1970); Cooper, National Economic Policy in
an Interdependent World Economy, 76 YALE L.J. 1273, 1289-90 (1967).
105. For final products, the cost burden to be offset could also take into account any
consumption tax on intermediate products. For a case in accord under the first
sentence of EEC Treaty article 95, see the opinion of the Court of Justice of the
European Communities in Molkerei-Zentrale Westfalen/Lippe GmbH v. Hauptzollamt
Paderborn, 7 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 187, 219-20 (1968). Cf. EEC Treaty art. 97. GATT
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be no different for a production tax not calculated by reference to
units of output, which also almost certainly would materially affect
price.1
08
There are further GATT problems with respect to bound items
when domestic firms qualify for exemption by taking effective
pollution-control measures. If the equalizing charge is considered
internal, article III, paragraph 2 applies. If it is an import duty so
that article III, paragraph 2 is not directly applicable, the article II,
paragraph 2(a) exception to tariff bindings is available only for
charges imposed consistently with article III, paragraph 2. As we
have noted, there is authority for the proposition that a tax or charge
equivalent to a rebated internal tax is inconsistent with article III,
paragraph 2.107 Unless the rebate is extended to the import charge
when effective pollution-control measures have been taken by the
foreign producer-a step that we have seen to be administratively
awkward and likely to meet most-favored-nation objections' 08-it
could not be argued that domestic and foreign producers are treated
alike.109 An across-the-board charge probably would not be permis-
sible under article III, paragraph 2, in the absence of an applicable
exception or waiver.
If legal regulation is used in place of the production tax, it almost
certainly could not be supplemented by cost-equilibrating import
charges on bound items without running afoul of article II. The
exception in article II, paragraph 2(a) refers only to charges equiva-
lent to internal taxes under article III, paragraph 2, and is silent on
import charges tied to internal regulations. There is nothing to in-
precedent, however, is inconclusive. See Working Party Report, Schedules and Customs
Administration, 3d Supp. BISD 205, 210-11 (1955). See also K. DAm, supra note 58, at
122; J. JACKSON, supra note 58, at 297. It should also be permissible to offset increased
costs attributable to per-unit taxes on the domestic production of intermediate products.
On the other hand, it is unlikely that consumption taxes on capital equipment would
have sufficient demonstrable influence on the price of the final product to be eligible
for offset.
106. If the tax is not levied on a per-unit-of-output basis, or if the offset en-
compasses increased costs of intermediate goods, the appropriate offsetting charge
would be difficult to calculate. Somewhat comparable difficulties have been encountered
in connection with European "cascade" taxes, which seem clearly to qualify for border
adjustment despite the inconclusive GATT Working Party Report mentioned in note
105 supra. On the difficulties involved in such cases, see K. DAm, supra note 58, at
121-24, 211-13; J. JACKSON, supra note 58, at 299-300.
107. See text accompanying note 85 supra.
108. See text preceding note 91 supra.
109. Compare the consumption tax case, discussed in text accompanying note 86
supra. The consumption tax exemption would be much simpler to administer, since its
availability would be determined by the condition of the goods as they cross the border.
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dicate that it could be stretched to cover the situation."10 Thus, if
the import charge is to be sustained, it would be necessary to rely
on exceptions or waivers outside the framework of articles II and III.
b. Exceptions and waivers. The General Agreement holds the
promise of several possible avenues of escape from the obligations
we have noted. Some are more clearly applicable in the pollution-
control context than others. Each involves a potential trade barrier.
(1) The health exception. It has been asserted above that avail-
ability of the health exception in article XX(b) is reasonably clear
in the consumption tax context."' With equitable administration
of the consumption tax, the exception should be available with re-
spect to the most-favored-nation obligation as well as the constraints
of articles II and III. In the context of production taxes or compa-
rable regulation of production, however, the applicability of the
health exception would be much less clear, since the charge on im-
ports would no longer be directly for the health-related purpose of
eliminating the pollution burden caused by the imported products.
The argument in favor of the health exception's applicability to the
production pollution situation would be that the tax or regulation
is designed to stimulate health-preserving domestic pollution control,
and that the economic deterrents to unilateral industrial pollution
control are so formidable in the absence of protection that a limited
import charge should be considered part and parcel of the basic
health measure. If the health measure could not as a practical matter
be imposed otherwise, it might be argued that the import charge is
''necessary" to protect health.
The argument, however, goes too far. In the first place, unless
the charge contains exemptions for imports already burdened by
significant pollution-control costs, it would seem to restrict trade for
reasons unrelated to health. A more important objection is that the
bond between the charge and the health measure is too tenuous. If
the argument were accepted, it would supply a precedent for similar
110. Cf. In re Import Duties on Gingerbread, 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 199, 217-18 (1963),
in which the Court of Justice of the European Communities disallowed under article
12 of the EEC Treaty an import charge designed to offset high costs imposed on
domestic producers as a result of agricultural price-support policies. It rejected an
argument that the charge was permissible under article 95. See also 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R.
at 210-11 (submissions of the Advocate-General). Articles 12 and 95 are the counter-
parts of GATT articles II, paragraph 1 and III, paragraph 2.
The divergence between the GATT treatment of the tax and legal regulation pol-
lution-control approaches is even dearer in connection with export subsidies than
with import charges. See text accompanying notes 151-57 infra.
111. See text following note 82 supra.
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assertions concerning import charges to complement health-related
measures-such as child labor laws and plant safety regulations-
which would put severe strain on the effectiveness of articles II and
111.112
If the argument is made, however, the ambiguities of article
XX(b)-and the necessity that each state be given considerable lati-
tude to preserve public health-make effective challenge difficult.
Thus, this would seem to be one of those situations frequently en-
countered in the international legal system, in which the absence
of an international decision-making body capable of authoritatively
rejecting (or narrowing) an argument dictates a need for self-imposed
circumspection in its formulation, lest it return to haunt both its
maker and the ordering system.
(2) The security exception. Another GATT exception offering
few safeguards is that relating to security. Economists acknowledge-
but do not normally approve-the argument for tariff protection
of those industries necessary to national defense. 18 Authorization
to impose protective measures for this purpose is found in GATT
article XXI, which provides in part that
[n]othing in this Agreement shall be construed... (b) to prevent any
contracting party from taking any action which it considers necessary
for the protection of its essential security interests ... (ii) relating to
the traffic in arms, ammunition and implements of war and to such
traffic in other goods and materials as is carried on directly or in-
directly for the purpose of supplying a military establishment....
The self-judging nature of the security exception is apparent. It
was recognized in the drafting stage that "the spirit in which Mem-
bers of the Organization would interpret these provisions was the
only guarantee against abuse."1 4 In a sophisticated and interdepen-
112. Cf. Panel Report, Italian Discrimination Against Imported Agricultural Ma-
chinery, 7th Supp. BISD 60, 64 (1959), in which a GATT Panel noted the importance
of construing article III in such a way as to avoid the danger of erosion of bindings
under article I1. See also GATT SrtuY, supra note 3, at 16.
113. See, e.g., P. EUvswoRTH, THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY" 262-63 (4th ed. 1969);
G. VON HABERLER, THE THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 239-40 (1936); W. KRAusE,
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMNCS 131 (1965).
114. See ANALYTICAL INDEx, supra note 67, at 120, quoting from the report of a
preparatory committee for the Havana Conference. The security exception has been
formally invoked once, by the United States, to justify the imposition of export
controls on strategic goods. Czechoslovakia objected on the basis of the most-favored.
nation clause. The CONTRACTING PARTIES rejected the Czech complaint, without
shedding any light on the scope of article XXI. See id. at 120; II BISD 28 (1952). For
further discussion, see J. JAcKsoN, supra note 58, at 749; S. MuHrArAiA, THE LEGAL
FRPaEwoRK oF WoaL TRADE 176-79 (1958). The primary relevance of article XXI in
the pollution-control setting relates to the increase of bound duties rather than to
most-favored-nation treatment.
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dent national economy, the argument could be made that virtually
all industries are essential to national security, and that traffic in
almost any goods is carried on "directly or indirectly for the purpose
of supplying a military establishment."" 5 Any attempt to stand on
such an argument, however, would obviously be inconsistent with
the purposes of the General Agreement. If the argument is made at
all in the pollution-control context, it cannot in good faith be ex-
tended beyond protection for industries manufacturing products es-
sential for military use in wartime (munitions, aircraft, and so forth)
or essential components of such products (for example, steel). Even
as to these industries, the argument for release from the constraints
of articles II and III is unconvincing unless the effect of pollution
control would be to threaten them with serious decline or extinc-
tion116
(3) The escape clause. The GATT "escape clause" in article
XIX, paragraph 1 permits suspension of certain GATT obligations
when a product is being imported in such increased quantities as
to cause or threaten serious injury to domestic producers, if the in-
creased imports are a result of "unforeseen developments" and of
obligations incurred by a contracting party under GATT.17 The
escape clause would not normally permit suspension of the most-
favored-nation requirement, since the obligation to be suspended
must have been a cause of the increased imports.118 Its primary use
has been the avoidance of article II obligations concerninz tariff
bindings. It could conceivably be aoplied also to article III con-
straints on internal taxes, such as the effective prohibition of an
import charge in conjunction with the legal regulation pollution-
control approach if the charge is considered internal." 9
115. Cf. K. DAm, supra note 58, at 201-02: P. ELLSWORTH, supra note 118. at 265. For
discussion of attempts by a wide variety of United States industries to qualify for pro-
tection under the national security provisions of United States trade legislation, see
Knapp, The Buy American Act: A Review and Assessment, 61 CoLum. L. REv. 430, 455-
58 (1961). For the pertinent legislation currently in force, see 19 U.S.C. § 1862 (1970).
116. If imports burdened-by pollution-control costs were exempted from the import
charge, the argument for release from the most-favored-nation obligation would be
considerably more attenuated than in the case of the health exception, since the
reason for differentiation among imports would have little to do with the purpose
of the exception.
117. The escape clause benefits not only domestic producers of "like products,"
but also producers of "directly competitive products." Compare the narrower scope
of product coverage in the most-favored-nation clause, discussed in text accompanying
note 76 supra and in note 91 supra. See also J. JACKSON, supra note 58, at 261-62.
118. GATT preparatory work indicates that most-favored-nation treatment was
to be maintained. See ANA.rYrcAL INDEx. supra note 67. at 108, quoting Havana
Charter Interpretative Note; J. JAcrsoN, supra note 58, at 564-65.
119. See text following note 99 supra.
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"Unforeseen developments" include those "occurring after the
negotiation of the relevant tariff concession which it would not be
reasonable to expect that the negotiators of the country making the
concession could and should have foreseen at the time when the
concession was negotiated.1 120 A reasonably strong argument may
be made that the environmental crisis is such an unforeseen devel-
opment, with respect to article III obligations and to bindings made
before the current environmental awareness had matured. It should
be noted, however, that the governmental response, rather than the
crisis itself, would create the conditions leading to increased imports.
There is a choice among pollution-control approaches. One-the
use of production subsidies-would tend to minimize any increase
in imports, though it would raise GATT problems of its own.121 In
any event, there is merit to the argument that, so long as the chosen
governmental response is appropriate to the circumstances, even
though other responses might be made, the "unforeseen develop-
ments" prerequisite is met.
A number of other conditions must be met if article XIX, para-
graph 1 is legitimately to be invoked. 122 In an appropriate pollution-
control case these conditions could be fulfilled. But if the objective
is protection over a broad range of products, article XIX would not
be the appropriate vehicle. It is intended to provide a temporary
safety valve to be used in behalf of injured producers of a given
product or limited group of products, and has been applied substan-
tially in that manner.123 At most, article XIX would be appropriate
for emergency action concerning a limited number of items that
might be particularly susceptible to import competition when
pollution-control costs are increased. 24
120. REPORT ON THE WITHD.RAWAL BY THE UNITED STATES OF A TARIFF CONCESSION
UNDER ATCLE XIX OF THE GEmNmAxL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE 10 (1951),
noted also in ANALYTICAL INDEx, supra note 67, at 107.
121. See pt. IM. B. infra.
122. Particularly significant is the requirement that the increased imports must
cause or threaten "serious injury." Moreover, the action taken must be temporary.
See generally K. DAM, supra note 58, at 99-107; J. JACKSON, supra note 58, at 559-64.
It is questionable whether these conditions have always literally been met in practice.
See, e.g., id. at 229. Cf. I. KRAvis, DOMESTIC INTERESTS AND INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS
66-70 (1963). There is no express requirement in article XIX that compensatory tariff
reductions be offered on other items, but it appears to be the practice to do so. See
G. CURZON, supra note 58, at 118-19; J. JACKSON, supra note 58, at 565-66.
123. See K. DAM, supra note 58, at 100. For a summary of the instances in which
the escape clause has been invoked, and of the accompanying compensatory (or re-
taliatory) action, see ANALYTICAL INDEx, supra note 67, at 109-13.
124. The emergency action could take the form of a quantitative restriction on
imports, rather than an increase in a bound duty or the application of a new internal
charge. See ANALYrICAL INDEX, supra note 67, at 108; K. DAmr, supra note 58, at 105-06.
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(4) Tariff renegotiation. Article XXVIII establishes periodic
"open seasons" during which tariff bindings may be altered by
agreement with contracting parties primarily concerned, or failing
agreement, by unilateral withdrawal subject to retaliatory suspen-
sion of "substantially equivalent concessions." Renegotiation may
occur outside the "open season" if authorized, in special circum-
stances, by the CONTRACTING PARTIES.125 Parties are obliged
to "endeavor to maintain a general level of reciprocal and mutually
advantageous concessions not less favourable to trade than that pro-
vided for in this Agreement prior to such negotiations."' 26
It would be mistaken to view article XXVIII as a carte blanche
for widespread tariff increases in the pollution-control context. Con-
straints are supplied by the requirement of negotiation followed by
agreement (normally involving compensatory tariff adjustments) or
possible retaliation and by the entreaty to maintain the pre-existing
general level of concessions. Although the entreaty appears not al-
ways to have been strictly observed,127 it cannot be considered a dead
letter. Its inclusion establishes that article XXVIII negotiations are
not intended to result in materially increased over-all levels of pro-
tection. The negotiation procedure tends to reinforce this principle,
unless trading partners are mutually interested in increasing tariffs.
A nation pursuing unilateral pollution control cannot therefore ex-
pect to rely on article XXVIII for much more than a limited adjust-
ment of its tariff schedule-with concessions or potential retaliation
-to provide some protection for high pollution-control-cost indus-
tries.
(5) Balance-of-payments measures. If the balance-of-payments
consequences of increased domestic prices and reduced domestic out-
put are sufficiently serious, protection under article XII may be per-
missible. It relaxes the article XI prohibition of quantitative import
restrictions by permitting an industrialized country to impose them
to the extent necessary "(i) to forestall the imminent threat of, or to
stop, a serious decline in its monetary reserves, or (ii) in the case of
a contracting party with very low monetary reserves, to achieve a
reasonable rate of increase in its reserves."' 28 Consultation with the
125. See generally. K. DAm, supra note 58, at 82-99. For the background of the present
article XXVIH, see G. CUazoN, supra note 58, at 108-17.
126. GATT, art. XXVM, para. 2.
127. See K. DAr', supra note 58, at 94. GATT STUy, supra note 3, at 17, makes the
point that it would be virtually impossible, given the current level of tariff bindings
on industrial products, to maintain the general level of concessions if an industrialized
country alters its bindings significantly.
128. GATT, art. XII, para. 2(a). A similar, but somewhat less restrictive, standard
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CONTRACTING PARTIES is required, under article XII, para-
graph 4. In the determination of what constitutes a serious decline
in monetary reserves, a very low level of reserves, or a reasonable
rate of increase, the CONTRACTING PARTIES are required to
consult the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and to accept its
views.129 GATT article XII, paragraph 2(a) requires that "[d]ue re-
gard shall be paid.., to any special factors which may be affecting
the reserves of such contracting party or its need for reserves ......
Presumably the need to preserve the environment through price-
increasing pollution controls could be such a special factor.180 If re-
strictions are applied, they are to be progressively relaxed as circum-
stances improve.181
The article XII conditions are sufficiently fluid to permit the
IMF and the CONTRACTING PARTIES, as well as the initiating
state, considerable latitude to avoid the quota prohibition of article
XI. In practice, the fluidity of article XII has resulted in a wide
variety of import quotas.18 2 It has also provided a vehicle for import
surcharges on bound items, even though the article XII authoriza-
tion is limited by its terms to quantitative restrictions.1 83 The con-
sultation provisions of article XII do tend to limit unilateral freedom
of action, at least to the extent of requiring the acting state to justify
its measures by some showing of serious balance-of-payments diffi-
is applicable to developing countries under article XVIII, section B. See generally J.
JACKSON, supra note 58, at 689-90.
129. GATT, art. XV, para. 2. On Fund-GATT consultations generally, see deVries,
Collaborating with the GATT, in 2 THE INTERNATiONAL MONErrAY FUrN 1945-1965, at
332 (J. Horsefield ed. 1969).
120. See also ANALYrIcAL INDEx, supra note 67, at 65, quoting from Reports of the
Havana Conference. Article XII, paragraph 3(d) expressly recognizes that domestic
policies directed toward full employment and development of economic resources may
lead to high demand for imports, which could involve a threat to reserves. A party is
not to be required to "withdraw or modify" quantitative restrictions simply because
a change in those domestic policies might alleviate the problem. It might be inferred,
however, that other domestic policies (such as those directed toward pollution control)
that may lead to high import demand would not justify quantitative restrictions. But
pollution-control problems were not generally recognized when the GATT was drafted,
and no inference should be drawn from their omission. Cf. C. WiLcox, supra note 58,
at 86-87.
131. GATT, art. XII, para. 2(b). See also GATT, THE USE or QUANTITATivE IMroRT
REnmr11ONs To SAFaUAm BALANCES OF PAYMENTs 28-29 (1951).
132. See K. DAM, supra note 58, at 165-66, and references cited therein. Many
of the quotas have concerned agricultural products. See J. JACKSON, supra note 58, at
707-10. GATT article XI, paragraph 2(c) contains special exceptions for agricultural
products.
132. See, e.g., Working Party Report, United Kingdom Temporary Import Charges,
15th Supp. BISD 113 (1968). See also J. JACKSON, supra note 58, at 711-14; J. Kxuvis,
supra note 122, at 92-95. The imposition of a 10% import surcharge by the United
States in August 1971 was a conspicuous manifestation of the trend toward use of im-
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culties.' 84 Moreover, the increasing political acceptability of devalua-
tion removes some of the steam from balance-of-payments arguments
for quotas or surcharges. Nevertheless, if a pollution-controlling
country experiences a general increase in its price level and hesitates
(for whatever reason) to devalue, existing precedent does not en-
courage the belief that consultations under GATT procedures would
be effective to forestall import quotas or surcharges. 18 5
(6) Waivers. Article XXV, paragraph 5 permits the CON-
TRACTING PARTIES to waive a GATT obligation "in excep-
tional circumstances not elsewhere provided for" in the Agreement.
The waiver power extends to all GATT obligations. 86 In practice,
no attempt has been made to define the "exceptional circumstances"
referred to, and there is no effective legal restraint on the use of the
waiver power.8 7
This does not mean that the waiver authority has been exercised
indiscriminately. 8 It has been used in a limited variety of distin-
guishable situations, most of which bear a recognizable relationship
to express GATT exceptions. 89 Particularly relevant are the follow-
port surcharges rather than quotas for balance-of-payments purposes. Some GATT
parties challenged the conformity of the United States surcharge with the General
Agreement. See 23 INTL. FiN. NEws Suxvxx 277 (1971).
184. The consultation procedure appears to have had some effect in liberalizing
postwar quantitative restrictions. See G. CuRzoN, supra note 58, at 141-56; K. DAn,
supra note 58, at 164-66; I. KRAvis, supra note 122, at 63-64. GATT Working Parties
have on occasion applied pressure for the removal of unjustifiable quotas. See Working
Party Reports, Italian Restrictions Affecting Imports, 10th Supp. BISD 117, 130 (1962);
Panel Report, French Import Restrictions, llth Supp. BISD 94 (1963). See also the
Resolution adopted by the CONTRACTING PARTIES in United States Import
Restrictions on Dairy Products, II BISD 16 (1952), "recognizing" that the United
States had infringed article XI. The CONTRACTING PARTIES later authorized The
Netherlands to take retaliatory measures. See Netherlands Measures of Suspension of
Obligations to the United States, 1st Supp. BISD 32 (1958).
135. The bending of GATT rules would not necessarily extend to the most-favored-
nation dame. Although article I does not directly apply to quotas under article XII,
it does apply to import charges. There is no reason to withhold its application from
new import charges simply becase they take the place of quotas. For nondiscrimina-
tion provisions explicitly applicable to quotas, see GATT articles XIII and XIV.
186. See ANALYrICAL INDxx, supra note 67, at 147, quoting report of the London
preparatory meeting for the Havana Conference; Working Party Report, The European
Coal and Steel Community, Ist Supp. BISD 85, 86 (1953).
137. See J. JAcKSo N, supra note 58, at 544.
188. See, e.g., The European Coal and Steel Community, supra note 186, at 86
(consideration of whether the object sought by a proposed waiver was consistent with
the objectives of the General Agreement). See also CONTRACTING PARTIES, Article
XXV-Guiding Principles To Be Followed by the CONTRACTING PARTIES in
Considering Applications for Waivers from Part I or Other Import Obligations of the
Agreement, 5th Supp. BISD 25 (1957) (waivers should not be granted when CON-
TRACTING PARTIES "are not satisfied that the legitimate interests of other con-
tracting parties are adequately safeguarded").
139. The waivers are categorized in J. JACKSON, supra note 58, at 545-46, though
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ing: most-favored-nation waivers (which in general have permitted
preferential trading arrangements within geographic regions or have
involved developing countries); 140 waivers of article II obligations
while a party alters its tariff schedule and prepares for renegotiation
of concessions;' 4 ' and waivers of article XI obligations for parties in
balance-of-payments difficulties. 42 These provide ample precedent
for GATT, waivers in the case of a party instituting pollution-control
tax or regulatory measures that would otherwise violate articles I or
II, or that result in protective measures inconsistent with those ar-
ticles, if the measures fall within the general scope of express GATT
exceptions. The precedent could easily be extended to waivers of
article III obligations in appropriate cases.
To some extent waivers have simply seemed to stamp official
approval on what is being done anyway, 43 but this should not be
taken for granted. If a waiver is indeed to be regarded as a rubber
stamp, it signifies the virtual demise of the General Agreement as
a substantive framework for world trade. Unless a structurally sound
edifice rises immediately from the ashes, that would be a substantial
loss. Despite occasions when parties have appeared to bend the
GATT rules (not always with the benefit of an express waiver), the
impact of the rules on world trade relations remains considerable.
A major current issue is whether they will continue to have mean-
ingful impact in an era that includes such challenges to the tradi-
tional order as recurring international monetary crises, special trade
treatment for developing countries, and the economic effects of
the environmental awakening. Short of appropriate amendments to
GATT, or effective multinational coordination of pollution-control
policies, judicious use of the waiver instrument may be the only
moderately effective regulatory tool available to the international
not by reference to GATT exceptions. See also I. KnAvIs, supra note 122, at 84-85. A
table setting forth all waivers granted through 1968 appears in J. JACKSON, supra at
549-52.
140. See J. JACKSON, supra note 58, at 271, 545-47; GATT Secretariat, supra note 16,
at 800. Article XXIV provides an exception to the most-favored-nation obligation for
customs unions and free-trade areas. Part IV of GATT contains provisions drawing
attention to the special trade requirements of developing countries.
141. See CONTRACTING PARTIES' Decisions, United States-Tariff Classification,
12th Supp. BISD 57 (1964); Peruvian Schedule-Renegotiation, 13th Supp. BISD 27
(1965); Ceylon-Increases in Bound Duties, 16th Supp. BISD 22 (1969). GATT article
XXVIII provides for tariff renegotiation.
142. See J. JACKSON, supra note 58, at 546; text accompanying note 133 supra. The
corresponding GATT exception is in article XII.
143. This is particularly evident when the moving party is a major world power.
Cf. J. JACKSON, supra note 58, at 758, discussing the GATT waiver for United States
agricultural import controls. Even the liberally granted waiver, however, may contain
significant conditions with regard to its exercise. See K. DAf, supra note 58, at 355.
[Vol. 70:859
April 1972] Pollution Control in Industrial Countries 909
community to balance the interests affected by the environmental
challenge. Therefore, waivers for trade measures to offset pollution-
control costs should not be precluded; but neither should they be
automatic or open-ended.
B. GATT Problems Concerning Subsidies
As we have seen, country A may attempt to alleviate the com-
petitive disadvantage of pollution control by adopting production
subsidies or by applying export subsidies to goods that have borne
a production tax or regulatory burden in respect of their consump-
tion pollution propensities.144 The resulting GATT issues center on
the permissibility of production and export subsidies and the use of
countervailing duties by importing countries to neutralize the effect
of subsidies.145
The General Agreement does not embody provisions wholly ef-
fective, even on paper, to forestall the protective and trade-diverting
potentialities of domestic subsidies. 46 It is clear that a production
subsidy for import-competing goods-in the pollution-control con-
text or otherwise-will normally reduce imports below the no-
subsidy level, in the absence of demand-stimulating inflationary
measures. 47 It tends to nullify any comparative advantage enjoyed
by nonsubsidized competitors. From the standpoint of world eco-
nomic order, the widespread use of subsidies, accompanied by new
import barriers, could threaten the same sort of breakdown in trad-
ing relationships that competitive devaluations, uncorrelated with
market forces, helped to foster in the 1930's.148 Nevertheless, article
XVI, paragraph 4 prohibits only export subsidies (as distinguished
144. See text accompanying note 51 supra and pt. II. C. supra.
145. Some of the GATT provisions already discussed-such as the most-favored-
nation clause-are not likely to be invoked in the subsidy context. Others might well
be invoked, but do not raise sufficiently distinctive issues to be re-examined. These
include articles XX(b) & (g) (health and natural resources exceptions); XXI (security
exceptions); and XXV, paragraph 5 (waivers). The effect of production subsidies on
tariff bindings of the subsidizing country is discussed as a "nullification or impair-
ment" issue (at text accompanying notes 173-74 infra).
146. The subsidy provisions are in article XVI. Cf. article VI, dealing with counter-
vailing duties. On the background to the GATT subsidy provisions and the rationale
for them, see J. JACKSON, supra note 58, at 365-76.
147. In terms of Figure 4 supra, the effect of the production subsidy compared with
that of the production tax or regulation is to reduce imports from X2-X to X3-X.
Compare Figure 1 supra. Cf. Panel Report, Review Pursuant to Article XVI:5, 9th
Supp. BISD 188, 191 (1961).
148. Cf. G. CuRZoN, supra note 58, at 119; K. DAM, supra note 58, at 136; C. Wmcox,
supra note 58, at 126; Meier, The Bretton Woods Agreement-Twenty-five Years After,
23 STAN. L. Rav. 235, 253 (1971). On the competitive devaluations of the 1930's, see
L. YEAGER, INTERNATIONAL MONErARY RExATIONS 329-31 (1966).
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from production subsidies), and does so only for nonprimary prod-
ucts and for countries that have affirmatively undertaken the obliga-
tion by means of a formal Declaration." Most of the industrialized
countries, including the United States, have acceded to the Decla-
ration. 5 0
There should be no GATT problem with respect to exemption
of pollution-engendering exports from a domestic consumption tax,
even though the exemption results in export sales at prices below
those charged at home. 51 Such a tax would normally be "borne by
the... product"'152 and would be in the nature of a turnover tax
that could be rebated or exempted for exports, so long as the rebate
or exemption does not exceed the amount of the tax. The more seri-
ous question arises when a production tax (or regulation) is applied
in order to induce producers to eliminate pollution-caused excess
social costs from the consumption of their products and is then re-
bated for exports. 53 As in the case of offsetting import charges, the
legitimacy of an export rebate is normally expressed in terms of the
direct-indirect tax dichotomy.'r4 Similarly, such an approach is un-
exceptionable so long as it is restricted to the traditional types of
direct and indirect taxes, but should not be treated as a mechanical
solution to problems posed by new types of taxation. Since pollution
taxes on production would normally affect prices, an export rebate
would be consistent with GATT principles. This would be so
whether the tax is measured by units of output or otherwise. 55
However, if the legal-regulation approach is used instead of a pro-
duction tax, any cost rebate for exports would no longer be a tax
149. See Declaration Giving Effect to the Provisions of Article XVI, Paragraph 4,
9th Supp. BISD 32 (1961), 445 U.N.T.S. 294 (1962).
150. For a list of acceding countries as of January 1, 1969, see J. JACKSON, supra note
58, at 874-75 n.24.
151. Article XVI, paragraph 4 prohibits only export subsidies that have this price-
differential effect.
152. GATT, ad art. XVI, preamble. A question could conceivably arise from the
fact that the pollution-control tax would not be a general revenue tax in the usual
sense. See note 69 supra.
158. On the usefulness of this arrangement as a pollution-control device when do-
mestic demand is significant, see text accompanying notes 49-50 supra.
154. See text accompanying note 101 supra. The governments accepting the GATT
Declaration agreed in 1960 that they would consider as export subsidies under article
XVI, paragraph 4, inter alia, the remission for exports of "direct taxes or social welfare
charges on industrial or commercial enterprises" and the exemption of charges or taxes
other than those on importation or indirect taxes. See Working Party Report, Provi-
sions of Article XVI:4, 9th Supp. BISD 185, 186-87 (1961). The intended distinction
was clearly between taxes that affect price and those that do not, subject to the en-
trenched GATT presumption that income taxes do not.
155. See text accompanying note 106 supra.
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rebate and would therefore appear to run afoul of article XVI, para-
graph 4 for countries subject to the Declaration.'56 This seemingly
anomalous result is probably unavoidable in view of the understand-
able reluctance of GATT framers to enter into the morass of work-
ing out practicable measures for equalization of diverse and con-
flicting regulatory burdens. 57
If a direct production subsidy is adopted, the prohibition in ar-
ticle XVI, paragraph 4 is inapplicable. However, if the production
subsidy "operates directly or indirectly to increase exports of any
product from, or to reduce imports of any product into, its territory,"
the subsidizing country is obliged to provide details to the CON-
TRACTING PARTIES. 58 If another state feels that "serious preju-
dice" to its interests has occurred, it may request consultations with
a view to the possibility of limiting the subsidization. 59
The test whether the subsidy has increased exports or reduced
imports involves comparison with the level of exports or imports
that would exist absent the subsidy, rather than with historical levels
of exports or imports. 60 Moreover, the GATT Panel that approved
this test thought it "fair to assume that a subsidy which provides
an incentive to increased production will, in the absence of offsetting
measures, e.g., a consumption subsidy, either increase exports or
reduce imports."' 6' Consequently a country adopting a pollution-
control production subsidy will almost certainly be obliged to report
it and must be prepared to defend it in consultations with affected
nations.
In the pollution-control context, consumption subsidies, as well
as production subsidies, may serve to reduce imports. The problem
could arise if country A decides to subsidize consumers who use non-
polluting products, rather than tax or penalize those who do not. If
156. Cf. Working Party Report, French Trade Measures, 16th Supp. BISD 57 (1969),
dealing, inter alia, with a French measure providing exporters with partial compensa-
tion for wage increases. Although the Working Party "did not examine in detail the
question of the compatibility of the trade measures taken by the Government of France
with the General Agreement" (id. at 63), the tenor of the report dearly indicates dis-
approval. See id. at 62-64.
157. The anomaly of allowing export rebate for pollution taxes but not for pollu-
tion regulations is a particularly dear manifestation of the difficulties involved in
reaching workable accommodations of economic interests affected by pollution control
by means of a general trade agreement. Comparable anomalies exist on the import side
in connection with measures likely to be adopted to complement the tax and regulation
approaches. See text accompanying notes 96-110 supra.
158. GATT, art. XVI, para. 1.
159. See J. JACKSON, supra note 58, at 391-92; Panel Report, Operation of the Provi-
sions of Article XVI, 10th Supp. BISD 201, 206-07 (1962).
160. See Review Pursuant to Article XVI:5, supra note 147, at 191.
161. Id.
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domestic products qualify their users for the subsidy but some or all
imports do not, demand would normally shift away from the im-
ports. The applicable GATT provision is article III, paragraph 4,
requiring equality of treatment between imported and domestic
products with respect to laws and regulations affecting, inter alia,
their sale, purchase, and use.102 The issues are essentially the same
as those regarding the consumption tax. So long as the subsidy is
available equally to domestic and imported products, it should not
contravene article III, paragraph 4.163
Finally, consideration must be given to the use of countervailing
duties by trading partners of the country using pollution-control-
related subsidies. Article VI, paragraph 3 authorizes, by negative
implication, countervailing duties unilaterally imposed by an import-
ing country, not to exceed the amount of the subsidy in the exporting
country. Article VI, paragraph 6(a) requires that there be material
injury to a domestic industry before a countervailing duty is applied.
Article VI, paragraph 4 prohibits the duty in the case of exemption
or refund of taxes "borne by the like product" in the exporting
country-a prohibition that would, in general, preclude imposition
of a countervailing duty with respect to an export rebate of pollution
taxes, but not with respect to a rebate of regulatory burdens. 164
It is not necessary to show that any provision of article XVI has
been violated in order to impose countervailing duties.106 Conse-
quently there is no reason why they could not be applied to produc-
tion subsidies granted for pollution-damage avoidance, provided that
the injury requirements either are met or are inapplicable because
of the appropriate protocol by which the importing state adheres to
GATT.166
C. Nullification or Impairment
Article XXII, providing generally for consultations, and article
XXIII, concerning "nullification or impairment," comprise the pri-
162. See Italian Discrimination Against Imported Agricultural Machinery, supra
note 112, at 62-65, in which a GATT Panel applied article III, paragraph 4 to a con-
sumption subsidy case.
163. See text accompanying note 86 supra. In any event, the health exception of
article XX(b) should be available.
164. See text accompanying notes 151-57 supra.
165. See Group of Experts Report, Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties, 9th
Supp. BISD 194, 200 (1961). On the possible use of countervailing duties to offset the
cost advantage of products that have not been subjected to pollution controls in the
country of production, see note 91 supra.
166. See note 79 supra. The term "material injury" in article VI, paragraph 6(a)
has been supplemented by an enumeration of factors bearing on the extent of injury
in the International Anti-Dumping Code, June 30, 1967, art. 8(b), [1968] 4 U.S.T. 4348,
T.LA.S. No. 6431. A narrow interpretation of "material injury" is in keeping with the
need for safeguards in connection with the article VI authorization to act unilaterally.
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mary dispute-settlement mechanism of GATT. Article XXIII au-
thorizes representations among parties, and eventual referral to the
CONTRACTING PARTIES, if a party
should consider that any benefit accruing to it directly or indirectly
under this Agreement is being nullified or impaired or that the at-
tainment of any objective of the Agreement is being impeded as the
result of (a) the failure of another contracting party to carry out its
obligations under this Agreement, or (b) the application by another
contracting party of any measure, whether or not it conflicts with
the provisions of this Agreement, or (c) the existence of any other
situation ....
In practice the first step in such a case is consultation among affected
parties. If a dispute remains, ensuing stages include conciliation by
a GATT Working Party or Panel, recommendations by the CON-
TRACTING PARTIES if conciliation fails, and-occasionally--
authorized retaliation.1
67
There could be nullification or impairment whether or not the
trade measures taken by the pollution-controlling state contravene
the provisions of the General Agreement. 68 This could be so, for
example, if a GATT exception is applicable or if a waiver is ob-
tained,169 so long as the damaging effects could not reasonably have
been foreseen when the measure was taken or the waiver issued. 70
It is evident that import charges intended to offset increased
domestic pollution-control costs could nullify or impair benefits un-
der GATT. If they are inconsistent with substantive GATT provi-
sions, they would involve prima facie nullification or impairment.'7 '
This appears to be the case even if a waiver has been granted.172 It
may also be the case whenever production subsidies on bound items
are involved. A GATT Working Party has said that
a contracting party which has negotiated a concession under Article
II may be assumed, for the purpose of Article XXIII, to have a rea-
sonable expectation, failing evidence to the contrary, that the value
of the concession will not be nullified or impaired by the contracting
167. See GATT, art. XXIII, para. 2; K. DAw, supra note 58, at 364-68.
168. See GATT, art. XXIII, para. l(b); Italian Discrimination Against Imported
Agricultural Machinery, supra note 112, at 65.
169. See ANALYTIcAL INDax, supra note 67, at 119, citing report of the Geneva pre-
paratory meeting for the Havana Conference (concerning the security exception in arti-
cle XXI); id. at 125-26 (instances of waivers reserving the right of other parties to have
recourse to article XXIII).
170. See J. JACKSON, supra note 58, at 183; The Australian Subsidy on Ammonium
Sulphate, supra note 67, at 193; Working Party Report, Quantitative Restrictions, 3d
Supp. BISD 170, 188 (1955).
171. See J. JACKSON, supra note 58, at 182; Uruguayan Recourse to Article XXIII,
supra note 94, at 100.
172. Id. at 100 n.1.
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party which granted the concession by the subsequent introduction
or increase of a domestic subsidy on the product concerned.17
The statement is circular. Nevertheless, since the existence of "nulli-
fication or impairment" turns in part on the expectations of GATT
parties at the time benefits under the Agreement accrue to them
(e.g., at the time a tariff concession is negotiated), the statement has
been thought to indicate that the introduction of a domestic subsidy
for production of an item bound under GATT involves, in effect, a
prima facie nullification or impairment of GATT benefits. 7 4
If the trade-related measures do not contravene GATT, they
raise the issue of how to judge whether lawful trade conduct justifies
complaint. It has been thought that in such cases an "injury" re-
quirement is implicit in the concept of nullification or impairment 75
GATT investigating bodies, however, have not explicitly defined an
injury standard. Nor have they required a showing of any precise
quantum of damage suffered, so long as the action taken by the re-
spondent state appears likely to have an adverse effect on a GATT
benefit (such as a tariff binding) and could not reasonably have been
foreseen when the benefit accrued. 76
If there is nevertheless an injury requirement, it is probable that
injury should be judged by reference to trade and profit levels that
would prevail in the absence of the measure complained of, rather
than simply by comparison with pre-existing levels. This tends to
strengthen the complainant's position by permitting a showing of
injury even though trade and/or profit levels have not fallen if they
would have risen in the absence of the new measure. This approach
173. Working Party Report, Other Barriers to Trade, 3d Supp. BISD 222, 224
(1955). See also Operation of the Provisions of Article XVI, supra note 159, at 209.
174. See J. JACKSON, supra note 58, at 182-83, 388. The statement apparently means
that parties are presumed to expect that no subsidy on the bound item will subse-
quently be introduced. Compare The Australian Subsidy on Ammonium Sulphate,
supra note 67, at 193, which suggests that there may be no such presumption regarding
new production subsidies on substitute products. There is no reason to distinguish be-
twveen expectations about future subsidies on the same product and those on direct
substitutes.
The statement should not be construed to apply to consumption subsidies for
which imported as well as domestic products are eligible, even though the imported
product in a given case may not qualify for the subsidy. See text accompanying notes
162-63 supra. The consumption subsidy and consumption tax are mirror images. Per-
missibility of such consumption measures-if evenly administered-is sufficiently in-
grained in articles II and I that parties must be presumed to expect that new ones
could be adopted after a tariff binding is made. Consumption subsidies, however,
might be found to nullify or impair most-favored-nation benefits under articl I. Cf.
text accompanying notes 75-79 supra.
175. See J. JACKSON, supra note 58, at 181-82.
176. See The Australian Subsidy on Ammonium Sulphate, supra note 67, at 193-94;
Treatment by Germany of Imports of Sardines, supra note 67, at 56.
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is suggested by at least one of the reported conciliation proceedings
1' 77
and is consistent with the thrust of GATT toward deterrence of con-
duct inconsistent with trade liberalization objectives. It is consistent
also with the position taken by the CONTRACTING PARTIES
concerning the production-subsidy notification and consultation re-
quirements of article XVI, paragraph 1.1' It would fill the lacuna in
the article XVI treatment of production subsidies by providing a
standard applicable to subsidies with respect to unbound items that
is only slightly less demanding than a prima facie standard applicable
to subsidies with respect to bound items. The problem with this ap-
proach, of course, is that demanding standards in international trade
matters are only as effective as the consensus that supports them. If
the perceived interests of the acting state call strongly for protection,
the standards are likely to have little deterrent effect; moreover, the
ultimate sanction-retaliation-results in further frustration of trade
liberalization goals.
If there is nullification or impairment, the CONTRACTING
PARTIES may authorize suspension of GATT obligations (retalia-
tion) only if the circumstances are "serious enough," i.e., only as a
last resort.179 Hence, the major effort has been to obtain withdrawal
of the offending measures or the grant of compensatory concessions. 80
In the pollution-control context, however, neither of these remedies
may be palatable to the acting state if many of its major industries
contribute to the pollution damage and if the felt need to protect
those industries-or to protect the balance of payments-is strong.
Thus, retaliation under article XXIII is a distinct possibility.
177. See Working Party Report, Netherlands Action Under Article XXIII:2 To
Suspend Obligations to the United States, 1st Supp. BISD 62, 63 (1953), a case involving
a breach of the General Agreement by the respondent state. The Working Party did
not speak in terms of prima fade nullification or impairment, but said that "[i]t was
agreed... that it would be proper to take into account the contention of the Nether-
lands Government that the restrictions imposed by the United States had had serious
effects on the efforts which were being made by the Netherlands to stimulate its ex-
ports to the United States .... In some cases GATT investigating bodies have taken
note of trends in trade between the parties without indicating whether the trends were
legally significant in themselves or were simply useful to establish what current levels
could be. See French Assistance to Exports of Wheat and Wheat Flour, supra note 69,
at 54-55; Italian Discrimination Against Imported Agricultural Machinery, supra note
112, at 65-67. It would normally be relevant-even indispensable-to examine recent
trends in order to estimate what the current trade level would be in the absence of
the subsidy.
178. See text accompanying note 160 supra.
179. See Working Party Report, Organizational and Functional Questions, 3d Supp.
BISD 231, 250-51 (1955).
180. Id. See also I. KlnAvis, supra note 122, at 131, asserting that in article XXIII
proceedings "the success of GATT in achieving settlements that avoided the further
contraction of trade was notable."
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IV. CONCLUSION
GATT substantive rules seem clearly to permit one useful
pollution-control device-the consumption tax-despite the fact that
the tax directly affects trade. In this area GATT rules and optimal
pollution-control methods mesh, partly because the consumption tax
fits the GATT "indirect tax" mold, but also because of the safety
exception. That exception should also serve to permit comparable
direct regulation of consumption. But uncoordinated consumption
measures among pollution-controlling countries could amount to
formidable nontariff trade barriers. Moreover, consumption mea-
sures cannot alone solve the industrial pollution problems of a de-
veloped country. They are inappropriate for control of pollution
arising from production methods, where much of the problem lies.
Even as to production, if governmental measures designed to avoid
pollution damage were limited to taxes or regulatory devices applied
to domestic producers, without corresponding trade measures, no
significant GATT problems would arise. As the measures take on
protective or export-stimulating characteristics, however, they pose
the multifaceted GATT questions we have been considering.
These questions could be resolved in individual cases through
informal GATT negotiations and consultations, or through formal
waiver or conciliation proceedings. The considerations examined
above would play a role in shaping the assertions, responses, and
decisions. But without some sort of effective international coordina-
tion of national environmental policies, the cumulative economic
pressures on environmentally activist, industrialized nations may
pose too great a challenge for the present GATT ordering system
to provide consistent, workable solutions. A large variety of traded
products would probably be affected. If fresh trade barriers are fore-
stalled, a significant new threat to the postwar trade liberalization
framework would be averted. But the victory could be Pyrrhic if-
as the analysis in part II shows is possible in an environmentally un-
regulated world-the practical alternatives left to the states con-
cerned are displacement of workers in affected industries and/or
balance-of-payments difficulties, on the one hand, or industrial pol-
lution control falling far short of optimality, on the other.181
Avoidance of new trade barriers is in any event far less than cer-
181. The worker displacement problem is not wholly alleviated by potential employ-
ment opportunities in pollution-control industries and the like. The human and tech-
nological problems of worker readjustment have never proved easy to solve, nor is
there a guarantee that aggregate economic activity in any given country will be suffi-
dent to absorb all retrainable labor.
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tain. As we have seen, exceptions to GATT obligations may be found
(or may be stretched, with or without a waiver) for much of what
pollution-controlling states would be under pressure to do. It is an
open question whether the deterrent provided by article XXIII con-
sultations with their threat of retaliation, or by such lesser remedies
as countervailing duties, would be adequate to preclude the adoption
of new trade measures by states serious about environmental protec-
tion. If new trade measures do ensue, resources are likely to be
wasted and GATT objectives frustrated, at least temporarily. There
is also the specter-not lightly to be dismissed in an era of reawaken-
ing protectionism and economic instability-of an unravelling of
postwar trade gains through retaliation and discrimination against
"offending" nations. GATT as presently constituted is undergoing
severe strains as a force for maintenance of a liberal economic order-
ing system; it may not be able readily to withstand stress from yet
another source.
1 8 2
The inescapable conclusion is that the economic argument for
effective multinational coordination (or regulation) of pollution-
control efforts in the developed countries is stronger than has been
generally realized. 83 In the absence of effective coordination, GATT
provides some rules and procedures that will have to be used to try
to find a balance among liberal trade policies, national full-employ-
ment objectives, and pollution-control imperatives. But the outlook
is cloudy at best if GATT has to go it alone in its present form. 8
4
182. For a somewhat more optimistic prognogis than that offered here, see GATT
STuDY, supra note 3, at 21-22.
183. Recognition of the point is beginning to appear at official levels. See state-
ment of Russell E. Train, Chairman of the Council on Environmental Quality,
in Hearings on Conventions and Amendments Relating to Pollution of the Sea
by Oil Before the Subcomm. on Oceans and Intl. Environment of the Senate Comm.
on Foreign Relations, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 178 (1971); S. REP. No. 92-451, 92d
Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1971). The EEC Commission has acknowledged the necessity of
joint action regarding pollution control in the European Common Market. See The
Times (London), July 24, 1971, at 4, col. 1; EuoPEAN COMMUNITY, Sept. 1971, at 9.
Cf. GATT STuny, supra note 3, at 22-23; OECD, OECD AT WORK FOR ENVIRONMENT 7,
13, 29 (1971); OECD ENVIRONMENT DIREcroRATE, GOvmRNmNrTAL REsONSmiLrrrs FOR
THE APLICATION AND CONTROL OF TECHNOLOGY IN RELATION TO MAN's ENVIRONMENT 16
(1971).
It is possible, of course, that even without formal multinational pollution-control
coordination, bargains could be reached among individual countries to offset enhanced
costs to their most seriously affected industries. Cf. Doud, supra note 81, at 266. It is
most unlikely, however, that such ad hoc bargaining could provide a comprehensive
solution.
184. Adoption of an international monetary system based on freely fluctuating
exchange rates could relieve balance-of-payments pressures, but would not in itself
resolve problems of providing full employment or of avoiding other domestic socio-
economic disturbances arising from loss of competitiveness on the part of pollution-
controlled industries. Moreover, freely fluctuating exchange rates raise some problems
of their own. The literature on fixed and flexible exchange rates is vast. See, e.g., P.
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The conflict between optimal economic and environmental objec-
tives is a real one that will inevitably be resolved either by subordi-
nating one to the other or, perhaps, by a form of multinational co-
ordination capable of providing assurance to a pollution-conscious
nation that others are acting similarly-assurance, in effect, that its
pollution-controlled industries will not price themselves out of their
own and world markets.
It is beyond the scope of the present discussion to delve into the
form such a system should take. It could be a functioning interna-
tional regime capable of regulating as well as coordinating, or per-
haps simply an agreement among industrialized countries to co-
ordinate their pollution-control efforts. It could conceivably be
incorporated into a revised and revitalized GATT. Ideally, of
course, it should ensure that optimal pollution-control measures
are adopted and enforced in each nation. This would have the
effect of removing pollution-caused divergences between marginal
social costs and marginal values, and would provide the best at-
tainable solution from the standpoint of efficient use of world
resources-a solution second-best in terms of efficiency only to full
elimination of all divergences, however caused.18, No one supposes
that truly optimal results could be attained in practice, but the
closer the world community can come to them the more likely it is
that world economic and environmental interests can be harmonized.
EINZIG, THE CASE AGAINST FLOATING EXCHANGES (1970); M. FRIEDMAN, The Case for
Flexible Exchange Rates, in ESSAYS IN POSInVE ECONOMICS 157-203 (1953); M. FIDMAAN
& R. ROOSA, TE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS: FREE VERSUS Fr=o EXCHANGE RATES (1967);
G. HALM, TOWARD Lnirrn EXCHANGE-RATE FLEXIBILrrY (Princeton Essays in Intl. Fin.
No. 73, 1969); F. MACHLUP, PLANS FOR REFORM OF THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYs-
Trm 73-88 (1964); E. SOHMMN, FLE LE EXCHANGE RATES (rev. ed. 1969); R. TRIFIN,
OUR INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEx: YESTERDAY, TODAY, AND TOMORRloW 72-75 (1968);
Meier, supra note 148, at 264-67.
185. As indicated in text accompanying note 11 supra, if the divergences to be cor-
rected are substantial in magnitude and are applicable to a wide variety of goods, the
chances of any adverse secondary effects outweighing the beneficial primary effects are
very small. Such would appear to be the case with industrial pollution.
